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1. Introduction 
 
Business models of content providers rely often on the possibility of making the enjoyment of 
media content subject to their prior consent. This is strongly associated with the power to 
establish a price for enjoying media contents and is considered crucial for generating revenues 
that allow a return on the investments made in creating or obtaining these contents and in 
providing them in a personalised way. 1 In this sense, Intellectual Property (IP) law and, 
particularly, copyright law constitute important instruments for media content providers. In fact, 
media content often embodies results of efforts that qualify for IP protection (e.g. a 
documentary that is the result of a person’s own intellectual creation and therefore qualifies for 
copyright protection). Such protection often results in economical rights that can be used to 
control (to a certain extent) the rights of third parties to enjoy those contents.  
A media content provider is able to resort to copyright protection if two conditions are fulfilled. 
First, a right has to exist over the media content, i.e., the media content must embody a result 
of efforts for which the law grants a right. Second, the media content provider must be the 
rightholder, either as a result of having created the content or as a result of an assignment, 
transfer or licence. 
In respect of the Media Trust project, this deliverable provides a first analysis of IP law as an 
instrument that media content providers can use to make the enjoyment of their media content 
dependent on consent. It starts by providing a basic explanation of the IP rights deemed 
relevant in relation to media content. The scope of protection offered by these regimes as an 
instrument to give media content providers a control over the enjoyment of their media content 
is examined and evaluated. In order to ensure that this legal analysis is of relevance for a 
further economic and business model analysis, the discussion on the capacity of the relevant 
regimes to provide such an instrument is linked to the value chains based on different types of 
embodiments of media content. These value chains refer to the linked set of value-creating 
activities all the way from basic raw material sources from component suppliers through to the 
ultimate end-use product delivered into the final consumers’ hands. 2  The scope of the 
protection granted to rightholders will finally be evaluated through the lens of natural and 
economic considerations. This will allow to delimit the ideal amount of protection to be offered 
to media content providers.  
Within the project, this analysis aims to provide an insight in the effects of intellectual 
property protection on the possibility of third parties to duplicate or alter the content 
offered by the media content provider and thus on the availability of these third parties 
                                                
1 Compare: A. VIZJAK and M. RINGSLETTER, Media Management: Leveraging Content for Profitable 
Growth, Heidelberg, Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, p. 12. 
2  For this broad understanding of the notion of a value chain, see e.g.: J. SHANK and V. 
GOVINDARAJAN, Strategic Cost Management: The New Tool for Competitive Advantage, New York, 
The Free Press, 1993, p. 13 and H. DEKKER, “Value chain analysis in interfirm relationships: a field 
study”, Management Accounting Research 2003, p. 1. Applying the concept of value chains to the media 
industry e.g.: G. SIEGERT and B. von RIMSCHA, “Economic bases of communication” in P. COBLEY 
and P. SCHULZ (eds.), Theories and Models of Communication, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 2013, p. 
133 and M. WÖSSNER, “The Media: An industry with Tradition at the Crossroads” in A. VIZJAK and M. 
RINGSLETTER (eds.), Media Management: Leveraging Content for Profitable Growth, Heidelberg, 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, p. 20 
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to provide direct substitutes for this content. The availability of substitutes resulting from 
unauthorised duplications or alterations will, after all, greatly influence the user 
acceptance of authentication systems introduced by the media content provider. 
  
5 
 
2. Relevant Intellectual Property regimes 
 
In the context of the legal protection offered to media content, copyright and related rights, on 
the one hand, and the protection against parasitic competition offered by unfair competition 
law, on the other hand, require closer attention.3 This is due to the fact that the results of efforts 
embodied in media content are most likely to qualify for protection under these regimes. 
Although it cannot be completely ruled out that certain elements may also be subject to other 
Intellectual Property (IP) regimes, these situations will be far too exceptional. 
The references to unfair competition law require some further explanation. Unfair competition 
law does not aim to protect results of efforts, but, instead, to evaluate business conducts. 
Although it can be used against imitations, these will only be deemed unfair where there are 
‘aggravating circumstances’. Yet, as both legal regimes can be used against imitations, 
commentators have argued that “(…) the distinction between intellectual property and unfair 
competition law sometimes appears more like a theoretical construct than a valid rule 
impacting actual practice”.4 
 
2.1. Copyright  
 
Only original works are subject to copyright protection. To qualify as original, a work must 
constitute its author’s own intellectual creation. This implies “creative freedom” (Murphy), 
“personal touch” (Painer) and “free and creative choices” (Football Dataco) in the creation of 
the work.5 
Copyright confers on a rightholder a bundle of exclusive rights over the work. This means that 
the rightholder is given an exclusive power to control certain categories of acts concerning the 
‘work’.  
These rights are initially granted to the person who was actually involved in the creation of the 
work. However, they can subsequently be transferred or licenced.6  
                                                
3 In relation to copyright and related rights see: Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society, OJ L 167, 22 June 2001, p. 10-19 (hereinafter: InfoSoc Directive) and Book XI, 
Title 5, Wetboek van economisch recht (Code of Economic Law), 28 February 2013, B.S., 29 March 
2013, p. 19975 (hereinafter: WER). In relation to the protection against parasitic competition offered by 
unfair competition law see: Art. VI.104 WER 
4 A. KUR and T. DREIER, European Intellectual Property Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
Cheltenham, 2013, p. 372 
5 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-06569; Joined 
Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v 
Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083; Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace 
v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] ECR I-13971; Case C-604/10 Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd; Case C-
406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd.. 
6 See recital 30 InfoSoc Directive 
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Copyright does not last forever. Instead, it is subject to a term of protection, according to which 
copyright shall run for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death, irrespective of the 
date on which the work was lawfully made available to the public.7 
 
2.2. Copyright related rights 
 
Related rights (also frequently identified as neighbouring rights) are also relevant in respect of 
media content. These rights relate to a certain work, but they are not directly associated to the 
work itself and to its author. Instead, the exclusive rights are granted to performers, phonogram 
producers, film producers and broadcasting organisations.8 
Similarly to copyright, related rights can be transferred or licensed. 
The duration of the right is limited to 50 years after the date of the performance. In certain 
cases, this term can be extended for further 20 years.9 
 
2.3. Unfair competition law 
 
Unfair competition law prohibits trade practices10 deemed unfair that (can) harm the interests 
of one or more enterprises.11 Case law has developed several type-cases based on this broad 
‘catch-all’ provision.  
One of these type-cases is the copy of an embodiment resulting from another party’s efforts in 
circumstances that show a ‘parasitic character’. 12  The following circumstances generally 
                                                
7 Art. 1.1. Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified version), OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, 
p. 12–18. There are limited exceptions to this rule. 
8 Art. 2,3 and 4 of InfoSoc Directive. See also Directive 2006/115/EC of 12 December 2006 (OJ 
2006 L 376/28), replacing Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental and 
lending rights and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. 
9 Art. XI.210 WER, transposing Art. 3 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified 
version), OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 12–18 as amended by Directive 2011/77/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 265, 11.10.2011, p. 1–5 
10 In this a ‘trade practice’ or ‘commercial practice’ refers to: “any act, omission, course of conduct or 
representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a business, directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product;” See: Art. I.8, 23° WER 
11 See: Art. VI.104 WER 
12  See: G. STRAETMANS, “Over parasitaire concurrentie in namaak”, DAOR 2011, p. 283 (“Van 
aanhaken of parasitaire concurrentie is er sprake wanneer een onderneming de faam van een andere 
uitbuit zonder verwarring te stichten in zonder de verdiensten van de andere onderneming omlaag te 
halen (zonder slechtmaking of dénigrement)”; P. CALLENS, “Leiden nieuwe cumulregels automatisch 
tot aanhaking wanneer auteursrechtelijke namaak wordt vastgesteld?” Jaarboek Handelspraktijken & 
Mededinging 2008, p. 690 (“Aanhaken of parasiteren houdt in dat een verkoper, zonder verwarring te 
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denote a case of ‘parasitic competition’: (i) the copied embodiment results from investments in 
manual or intellectual labour which reach a certain, though fairly low, threshold and (ii) copying 
and using this embodiment in trade practice provides an unlawful advantage.13 
From this general prohibition on ‘parasitic competition’, certain persons will then derive a 
relative right to demand compliance with this prohibition.14 One of these persons will be the 
interested party, i.e. the person who is exposed to the effects of the trade practice constituting 
unfair competition and who has an interest in having this practice and its effect ceasing. It is 
important to note that the intervention of unfair competition law against ‘parasitic competition’ 
does not result in granting the interested party a transferable, exclusive right to control acts 
concerning a certain object.15  However, the protection granted by unfair competition law 
against ‘parasitic competition’ can (at least in principle) be called upon every time an act of 
‘parasitic competition’ is performed, irrespective of the time passed since the creation of the 
embodiment. 
Trade practices will only constitute ‘parasitic competition’ if they involve copying and using the 
embodiments of these investments, in circumstances that result in an unlawful advantage.16 
Further, although this is somewhat debated, it has been argued that IP rights ‘pre-empt’ or 
have a negative ‘reflex-effect’ on unfair competition law’s protection against ‘parasitic 
competition’.17 The acceptance of such a negative ‘reflex-effect’ implies accepting that unfair 
                                                
stichten in zonder de verdiensten van een andere verkoper af te breken, door het kopiëren of imiteren 
profiteert van de creatieve inspanningen in investeringen die deze andere verkoper zich heeft getroost 
in van de faam in het succes die op grond hiervan werden verworven, terwijl hijzelf gespaard blijft van 
deze inspanningen in investeringen.”) 
13 See, for example: Cass. 29 mei 2009, NJW 2010, p. 151; Brussel 7 december 2006, T.B.H. 2007, p. 
580 (p.582-583) and Brussel 18 September 2003, JLMB 2004, p. 1630 (p. 1631); see also: J. LIGOT, 
F. VANBOSSELE, O. BATTARD and A. TALLON (editor), Les pratiques loyales, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, 
p.113 ; R. STEENNOT, F. BOGAERT, D. BRULOOT and D. GOENS, Wet marktpraktijken, Antwerpen, 
Intersentia, 2010, p. 76 
14 Art. XVII.7 WER 
15  See, for example: W. SCHÜNEMANN, "Kapitel 1. Allgemeine Bestimmungen" in H. HARTE-
BAVENDAMM and F. HENNING-BODEWIG, Gesetz gegen de unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG). 
Kommentar, München, C.H. Beck, 2004, p. 474 and P. ROUBIER, Le droit de la propriété industrielle, 
Parijs, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1952, p. 307 
16 Compare: T. SAMBUC, “Einleitung” in H. HARTE-BAVENDAMM and F. HENNING-BODEWIG (eds)., 
Gesetz gegen de unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG). Kommentar, München, C.H. Beck, 2004, p.410 ; H.-
P. GÖTTING, “Wettbewerbsrechtlicher Leistungsschutz (§ 4 Nr. 9)” in K.-H. FEZER, Lauterkeitsrecht. 
Kommentar zum Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), München, Beck, 2005, Band 1, p. 
762  
17 Pro acceptance of a negative ‘reflex-effect’, for example: D. MERTENS, “Het Hof van Cassatie over 
‘parasitaire mededinging’ in ‘aanhaking’. Scherpstelling of genadeschot?” noot bij Cass. 29 mei 2009, 
R.W. 2010-2011, p.1562; V. WELLENS, “Doorwerking van het auteursrecht in de Wet 
Handelspraktijken”, T.B.H. 2007, p. 590 ff.; Voorz. Kh. Brussel 12 januari 1987 in 12 juni 1989, Ing.-
Cons. 1990, p. 110 and Voorz. Kh. Brussel 15 September 2010, ICIP 2010, p. 633 (Anderzijds moet 
rekening worden gehouden met de negatieve reflexwerking op de bescherming van de intellectuele 
rechten, in die zin dat met de norm der eerlijke handelsgebruiken geen uitbreiding van de bescherming 
die het merkenrecht verleent kan worden verkregen. In combinatie met de vrijheid van kopie heeft deze 
negatieve reflexwerking tot gevolg dat de aantastingen van een merk, die geen merkinbreuk opleveren, 
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competition law does not protect against ‘parasitic competition’ where this would result in a 
protection similar to the one resulting from IP rights, in cases where IP law opted not to protect 
at all or provides a limited protection.18 Nonetheless, according to Belgian case law, protection 
by unfair competition law is possible even if the party involved cannot rely on an IP right.19 
 
2.4. Focus on economic rights granted by copyright and related rights  
 
Following the identification of the relevant regimes, the task at hand is to define which of these 
are best suited and provide the broadest scope of protection. After doing so, it is paramount to 
delineate the different types of rights provided by these regimes that best serve the interests 
of media content providers. 
 
2.4.1 Subsidiary Relevance of Unfair competition law 
 
The primary focus of this research will be directed towards copyright and related rights. The 
use of unfair competition law is only of limited relevance for controlling value chains relating to 
media content. 
The reasons for this approach are threefold: (i) unfair competition law does not grant an 
exclusive right, (ii) elements already enjoying copyright and related rights protection will be 
more easily and effectively protected by those rights and (iii) for elements that do not fall under 
an IP regime it is unsure whether the unfair competition principles concerning parasitic 
                                                
niet als daden van verwarringstichtende, slaafse nabootsing of parasitaire concurrentie kunnen worden 
gekwalificeerd.) 
Contra the acceptance of a negative ‘reflex-effect’, for example: J. GLÖKNER, Europäisches 
Lauterkeitsrecht, München, C.H. BECK, 2006, p.595 (“Lauterkeitsrechtlicher und sondergesetzlicher 
Leistungsschutz unterscheiden sich bei wettbewerbsbezogener Betrachtung nicht im Hinblick auf ihre 
Schutzrichtung, nähmlich die wettbewerbschädigende Ausbeutung einer Leistung durch Dritte zu 
verhindern, sonder allein hinsichtlich der technischen Ausgestaltung dieses schutzes.”) and Hof 's-
Hertogenbosch 28 februari 2012, LJN BV7194, para 4.17.3. (“Het hof volgt Xenos niet in haar - meest 
verstrekkende - stelling dat van afwijzing van de auteursrechtelijke grondslag negatieve reflexwerking 
uitgaat. Het enkele feit dat er wat betreft de door Blond c.s. opgevoerde tekeningen in decoratieve rand 
geen auteursrechtinbreuk wordt aangenomen, brengt niet mee dat geen ruimte is voor aanvullende 
bescherming op grond van artikel 6:162 BW.”) 
18 See: Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., Middenstand in Energie, Voorontwerp van wet 
betreffende de burgerrechtelijke aspecten van de bescherming van bepaalde intellectuele rechten, p. 9; 
V. WELLENS, “Doorwerking van het auteursrecht in de Wet Handelspraktijken”, T.B.H. 2007, p. 590; A. 
PUTTEMANS, Droits intellectuels et concurrence déloyale, Brussel, Bruylant, 2000, p. 13; R. VAN DEN 
BERGH, “Slaafse overname van documentatiemateriaal”, Jaarboek Handelspraktijken 1989, p. 202 
19 A. HALLEMANS, "Bescherming van mode op basis van het auteursrecht in de Marktpraktijkenwet”, 
IRDI 2012, afl. 4, p. 347 (Ook in de Belgische rechtspraak wordt systematisch erkend dat een beroep 
kan worden gedaan op de WMPC, zelfs als een prestatie niet wordt beschermd door een intellectuele-
eigendomsrecht.); See e.g.: Voorz. Kh. Antwerpen 11 maart 2011, A/09/10828, Brussel 1 maart 2011, 
RABG 2011, p. 1139 
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competition will apply. These last two hypotheses refer to the general question whether or not 
unfair competition provision will be able to grant a useful additional form of protection. 
(i) As noted above, the relative right granted against parasitic competition only allows the 
interested party to order to cease the infringing activity.20 This stands in contrast to rights that 
are derived from IP regimes, which are transferable and exclusive economic rights which can 
be used to control acts concerning certain embodiments of a result of efforts. The latter include 
the right to ask a judge to prohibit certain activities.21  
(ii) Elements that enjoy copyright and related rights protection will be more easily and 
effectively protected by those rights. The additional protection granted against parasitic 
competition will be of little practical use, given that the scope of protection granted by copyright 
and related rights will generally be broader. Although Belgian case law seems to accept the 
combined use of both possibilities,22 it is however unsure whether the reflex-effect principle 
can be fully written off.23 
Further, the amount of potential ‘parasitic copies or imitations’ will generally be less numerous 
than the group of potential manifestations under copyright and related rights protection.24 
Additionally, the types of acts covered by protection against parasitic competition are not 
greater than the ones to which copyright and related rights protection is granted.25 
The term of protection granted against parasitic competition will generally not be a useful 
addition. Although the protection arising against parasitic competition does not seem subject 
to a term, it seems very unlikely in practice to accept a term longer than the protection arising 
from copyright and related rights. On the one hand, this can be justified by the negative reflex-
effect of IP rights. On the other hand, from a legal theory perspective, even if the reflex-principle 
is rejected, an argument can be made against a supplementary protection term against 
                                                
20 Art. XVII.9 WER 
21 Art. XI.334 WER 
22 See: Cass. 29 mei 2009, NJW 2010, p. 151 (“De rechter kan nochtans op grond van het behalen van 
een voordeel om een andere reden dan het louter nabootsen, oordelen dat dit handelen onrechtmatig 
is. Die andere redenen bestaan niet alleen uit de miskenning van intellectuele eigendomsrechten of 
verwarringstichtende reclame maar kunnen elke vorm van onrechtmatig gedrag zijn.”) 
23 See: GLÖKNER, who stresses that claims based on unfair competition law are deemed “'minus' zum 
immaterialgüterrechtlichen Anspruch”. J. GLÖKNER, Europäisches Lauterkeitsrecht, München, C.H. 
BECK, 2006, p. 594 
24 See e.g.: Brussel (9e k.), 26 januari 2012, IRDI 2012, afl. 4, 368. The court rules on no infringement 
in relation to copyright, because there is no copy. A fortiori slavish imitation is not possible either.  
25 Compare: H. KÖHLER, “UWG § 4 Beispiele unlauterer geschäftlicher Handlungen” in H. KÖHLER in 
J. BORNKAMM, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, München, C.H. BECK, 2011, nr. 9.38 (“Das 
Angebot einer Nachahmung setzt voraus, dass die fremde Leistung ganz oder teilweise als eigene 
Leistung angeboten wird (vgl OLG Köln GRUR-RR 2005, 228, 229). Eine Nachahmung liegt 
dementsprechend ua dann nicht vor, (1) wenn ein Originalprodukt ohne Zustimmung des Herstellers 
vermarktet wird (vgl OLG Frankfurt GRUR 2002, 96 betreffend Übungsfahrzeuge; OLG Frankfurt 
GRUR-RR 2007, 104, 106). Auch eine analoge Anwendung des § 4 Nr 9 kommt nicht in Betracht, 
gleichgültig, ob das Leistungsergebnis mit oder ohne Willen des Originalherstellers in den Verkehr 
gebracht wurde. Auf den allgemeinen Rechtsgedanken der Erschöpfung durch erstmaliges 
Inverkehrbringen kommt es insoweit nicht an (aA wohl OLG Frankfurt GRUR 2002, 96);”) 
10 
parasitic competition: enough time has passed to recover the investments made and, 
therefore, there is no need to offer further protection with regards to the well-functioning of the 
market.26 
Lastly, copyright law grants a right against direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form. On the other hand, for parasitic competition, it is 
required not only a trade practice that constitutes a ‘slavish imitation’, but also the existence of 
‘accompanying circumstances’ that qualify it as unlawful behaviour in the light of each specific 
case.27 
(iii) In relation to elements that do not fall under an IP regime, the possibility of protection 
derived from unfair competition law should be taken into account. 
However, in practice, it is not obvious to rely on unfair competition. First, it can generally be 
assumed that media content will be subject to IP protection. Second, parasitic competition 
requires proof that each concrete trade practice in light of relevant circumstances is unfair. The 
fact that there is a similarity or imitation does not necessarily constitute an unfair trade practice, 
based on the principle of freedom to copy. The slavish imitation will only be unlawful in cases 
where the advantage gathered by the potential infringer results from aspects other than the 
imitation itself28 (e.g.: creating confusion, using the fame of a competitor, systematic and 
constant copying, etc.).29 
 
2.4.2 Focus on copyright law 
 
Considering the above, copyright and related rights will be analysed during the following 
chapters. As we will later discuss, there are several justifications for the existence of these 
rights. Amongst these is the property justification, which places strong emphasis in the fact 
                                                
26 Contra: German Federal Supreme Court Case I ZR 151/02, ‘Jeans’. Protection based on unfair 
competition granted for a period beyond the three years granted by the Community Design Regulation 
for unregistered community design. 
27 See: Cass. 29 mei 2009, NJW 2010, p. 151 (Een daad waarbij een verkoper het aanbod van een 
andere marktdeelnemer in verband met diensten of producten nabootst is in beginsel toegelaten, tenzij 
[…] dit aanbod doet onder begeleidende omstandigheden die indruisen tegen de eisen van de eerlijke 
handelsgebruiken.) 
28 See: Cass. 29 mei 2009, NJW 2010, p. 151 (De verkoper die, zonder zelf een creatieve inspanning 
te leveren, rechtstreeks voordeel haalt uit belangrijke inspanningen of investeringen gewijd aan een 
creatie met economische waarde van een andere verkoper, begaat nog geen daad strijdig met de 
eerlijke handelsgebruiken. De rechter kan nochtans op grond van het behalen van een voordeel om een 
andere reden dan het louter nabootsen, oordelen dat dit handelen onrechtmatig is.) Compare: The 
Londers criteria for parasitic competition: The copied embodiment is the result of a creative effort or a 
reasonable investment and has an economic value; the imitator derives a direct advantage from the 
efforts of the third party whose embodiment he copies and he himself does not contribute any creative 
effort to distinguish his embodiment from the one he copies. G. LONDERS, “Onrechtmatig imiteren, 
kopieren in aanhaken”, in J. STUYCK (ed.), Handelspraktijken anno 1996, Kluwer, Mechelen, 1997, p. 
191-192. 
29 F. VERHOESTRAETE, H. ABRAHAM, “Wanneer is slaafs nabootsen onrechtmatig naar Belgisch 
recht?”, Bull.BMM 2015, afl. 1, p. 3-4. 
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that the work results from the author’s efforts. Another line of thought focus on the work as an 
inalienable emanation of the author’s personality.30 On the other hand, economic justifications 
for IP law focus on the need to provide an incentive for creators. 
The view of the work as an inalienable emanation of the author’s personality is commonly used 
as a basis for moral rights, which include the right of attribution or paternity (right to claim 
authorship) and the right of integrity (right to object to derogatory treatments of the work).31 
Moral rights are inalienable, meaning that they cannot be transferred.32 Although in certain 
cases they can be waived, in civil law systems, such as the Belgium one, an author can only 
waive specific moral attributes in a precise way, not as a whole. Moreover, the core of the 
integrity right can in no way be waived.33  
We will focus our analysis in the economic rights resulting from copyright and related rights, 
since these will be the ones fully exploitable by media content providers. Economic rights entail 
the possibility for rightholders to exploit the works and performances by controlling certain 
categories of acts. However, these are not absolute rights, being subject to certain exceptions 
and limitations. 
The possibility of transferring economic rights from the original author to any third (natural or 
legal) person is one of their important characteristics. Such transfer can occur by operation of 
law, transmission upon death or by contract (e.g. assignment or license). This is important for 
media content providers, since they are not always the original rightholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 A. KUR and T. DREIER, European Intellectual Property Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
Cheltenham, 2013, p. 5-6 & 241-243 
31 Article 6bis, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
32 Art. XI.165, § 2 WER 
33 See: Art. XI.165, § 2 indent 2 and 7 WER. M-C JANSSENS, “Les droits moraux en Belgique”, Les 
Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle (Canada), vol. 25 n° 1, Janvier 2013, p. 91. 
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The focus of this research is aimed at finding the scope of protection granted to media 
content providers in relation to their ‘works’ or ‘performances’. Copyright and related rights 
grant rightholders economic rights that can be used to control certain categories of acts. 
For example, when a magazine publisher creates its monthly magazine, this will generally 
be considered a ‘work’. The physical copies of this magazine will be subject to economic 
rights, including the right to reproduce and distribute the physical copies of the magazine. 
In the following section, we will discuss the scope of these economic rights as well as 
legal exceptions to these rights.  For instance, second-hand sales of these magazines 
are generally exempted from the scope of the distribution right, and therefore do not 
require rightholders’ authorisations. 
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3. Copyright and related rights as instruments to control 
enjoyment of media content 
 
In light of a further economic and business model analysis, the capacity of copyright and 
related rights to control the enjoyment of media content can best be linked to the value chains 
concerning embodiments of this content. These value chains can consist of a broad variety of 
value-creating activities leading up to the eventual consumption of the embodiments of the 
media content. 
According to WÖSSNER, value chains in the field of media products can generally be 
structured into five steps: generating ideas, processing them into usable content, producing 
media products from that content, duplicating those products and distributing them.34 However, 
the author also points out that ultimately the characteristics of the actual value chains depend 
on the characteristics of the carrier media (e.g. print versus electronic media).35 
 
                                                
34 M. WÖSSNER, “The Media: An industry with Tradition at the Crossroads” in A. VIZJAK and M. 
RINGSLETTER (eds.), Media Management: Leveraging Content for Profitable Growth, Heidelberg, 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, p. 20. Compare: G. SIEGERT and B. von RIMSCHA, 
“Economic bases of communication” in P. COBLEY and P. SCHULZ (eds.), Theories and Models of 
Communication, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 2013, p. 133 (Who describe the typical value chain for the 
media industry as comprising: “conception, procurement, production, packaging, duplication, 
distribution, usage”).  
35 M. WÖSSNER, “The Media: An industry with Tradition at the Crossroads” in A. VIZJAK and M. 
RINGSLETTER (eds.), Media Management: Leveraging Content for Profitable Growth, Heidelberg, 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, p. 20 
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3.1. Requirements for granting exclusive rights 
 
Since Intellectual Property (IP) rights function as a limitation to the general principle of free 
competition, strict conditions are prescribed for their attribution. Rights are only granted to a 
result of efforts that requires an intellectual creation. The interpretation of ‘result of efforts’ or 
‘intellectual creation’ differs in relation to copyright and related rights. We will deal with these 
two realities separately. 
These requirements will be important to the different value chains in the field of media in the 
sense that they are aimed at verifying ‘the type of added value’. For instance, when looking at 
different steps in the traditional print media value chain, we notice that the first step is the 
generation of ideas. The question to be posed is whether these ideas fulfil the requirements 
for the grant of exclusive rights. Is the added value of creating media content from these ideas 
sufficient to benefit from IP law protection? 
 
3.1.1. Copyright  
 
Copyright requires an original ‘work’. As mentioned, such a ‘work’ is generally taken to refer to 
a person’s own intellectual creation that relates to expressing an idea in perceptible features. 
This definition entails two important components. First, there needs to be an expression of an 
idea. Mere ideas or concepts are not protected by copyright.36 Second, the work must be 
original. Following the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, this means the 
work must be ‘the author’s own intellectual creation’. This implies “creative freedom” (Murphy), 
“personal touch” (Painer) and “free and creative choices” (Football Dataco) in the creation of 
the work.37 The criterion of originality has been fully harmonised in the EU and concerns a 
uniform European notion.38 
A very modest intellectual creation may qualify as an original work.39 However, a person’s 
creation will not qualify as an ‘original work’ to the extent that it is directed at developing 
perceptible features that are solely dictated by their function.40 
                                                
36 E.g.: Brussel 3 oktober 2013, AM 2014, p. 29 
37 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-06569; Joined 
Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v 
Media Protection Services Ltd [2011] ECR I-09083; Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace 
v Ministerstvo kultury [2010] ECR I-13971; Case C-604/10 Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd; Case C-
406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd.. 
38  M-C JANSSENS, “De impact van het Internet op de sector van het auteursrecht (of is het 
omgekeerd?) – een analyse aan de hand van de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie”, SEW 2014, p 
454 (nr. 10). 
39 E.g.: F. GOTZEN, “Art. 1” in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2009, p. 6-7 
40 E.g.: U. LOEWENHEIM, "Abschnitt 2. Das Werk" in G. SCHRICKER, Urheberrecht Kommentar, 
München, C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 56 ff. 
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3.1.2. Related rights 
 
In relation to related rights, the grant of an exclusive right requires that an embodiment of the 
efforts is the result of a specific performance. In the EU, three groups of beneficiaries may be 
given neighbouring rights: Performers, Producers (of phonograms and of first depictions of 
films) and Broadcasting organizations. 
Performers can be actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, 
deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works.41 The embodiment of 
their efforts should result in the performance of a ‘work’, in the sense of copyright.42 This 
performance has to be personal, requiring the use of physical attributes.43 Additionally, the 
performance has to be ‘artistic’ as to exclude technical and sportive performances or 
performances that are limited to informing the public.44 
The producer can be described as the person, or the legal entity, who or which takes the 
initiative and has the responsibility for a first fixation.45 The embodiment of its efforts may result 
in either a phonogram, which is any exclusively aural fixation of sounds, or a first fixation of 
film which is a cinematographic or audio-visual work of moving images, with or without sound.46  
For broadcasting organizations, the embodiment of their efforts results in a transmission for 
public reception of sounds or of images and sounds. This transmitted signal contains data (e.g. 
a television show) that itself can be subject to separate exclusive rights. 
 
3.2. Idea-expression dichotomy 
 
In the following sections, we will deal with copyright and related rights jointly. There are several 
reasons for that. First, the applicable rules in respect of the applicable rights are generally the 
same. Second, there is no supremacy of copyright over related rights.47 Finally, the rights can 
be cumulated. 
As mentioned before, the results of efforts can be granted exclusive rights if they qualify as 
‘works’ or ‘performances’. The scope of these exclusive rights (like e.g. reproduction rights) 
                                                
41 See: Art. 3, a Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (Hereinafter: Rome Convention) 
42 This does not necessarily mean that the underlying work is subject to copyright protection. 
For instance, the performance of an actor will still be subject to protection despite the fact that 
the used script is in the public domain. 
43 See: F. BRISON, “Art. 34” in F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan 
Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 235 
44 Ibid., p. 236 
45 See : Art. 2, d WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 
46 See : Art. 3, b Rome Convention and Art 2, part 1 Rental and Lending Directive 
47 See: F. BRISON, “Art. 33” in F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan 
Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 230 ff 
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only relates to the expression of a ‘work’ or ‘performance’. The scope of copyright is limited to 
the particular expression of that idea. It does not cover the idea that underlies that expression.  
The exclusive rights granted by copyright results in exclusive powers of rightholders over 
expressions of the ‘work’. When looking at the value chains relating to media content, the 
scope of the exclusive rights has to be traced to the expression of the added value, not to the 
underlying idea. 
So that there is a reproduction of a work, two requirements must be met. First, the “copy” must 
display substantial similarities to those specific features of the author’s initial embodiment of 
the ‘work’. Second, these substantial similarities must be the result of a copy of the original 
work and cannot be the result of an independent creation made without knowledge of the 
existence of the first work.48 
 
 
3.3. Categories of acts subject to rightholders’ authorisation 
 
Copyright and related rights contain provisions on certain economics rights granted to 
rightholders. These are relevant to media content providers.  
Economic rights are, in essence, directed at granting an exclusive rights over expressions of 
an ‘immaterial good’. In particular, economic rights constitute a power to control certain legal 
categories of acts concerning a protected ‘immaterial good’. In the following section, we will 
analyse the dominant interpretations of these legal categories to establish their scope. In 
particular, we will analyse two points: (i) indications on the type of acts to which the legal 
categories refer to, and (ii) indications on the circumstances that determine whether these acts 
will actually be acts reserved to rightholders.49 This distinction arises from the circumstance 
that these rights are not absolute. Instead, they are subject to limitations and exceptions that 
restrict the exclusives granted by law.50 
Based on the exclusive economic rights resulting from IP laws, certain acts concerning the 
embodiments are subject to the authorisation of rightholders. These acts are devised into 
different categories, based on the type of embodiment they are concerned with and the 
                                                
48 E.g.: A. STROWEL, "La contrefaçon and droit d'auteur: conditions et preuve ou pas de contrefaçon 
sans 'plagiat'", Auteurs & Media 2006, p. 268 
49 Compare, for a similar distinction: G. MOM, “Uitvoering in (strikt) besloten kring”, ami 2010, p. 81 
50 See also: S. DUSOLLIER, Droit d'Auteur et Protection des Oeuvres dans l'Univers Numérique. Droits 
et Exceptions à la Lumière des Dispositifs de Verrouillage des Oeuvres, Brussel, Larcier, 2005, p. 364 
ff. 
For example if a photograph qualifies as a ‘work’, a possible reproduction would be an 
offprint of said photo on paper or a digital image file. This graphical representation has 
to be the same as the one created by the photographer. However, if someone creates 
the same photograph independently (without copying the first), the second photo will 
not qualify as a reproduction of the ‘work’ of the first photographer. 
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purpose of the act. When looking at the different activities within the value chains relating to 
media content, we see that these align with the different categories of acts.  
However, one has to take into account that the characteristics of these value chains depend 
on the characteristics of the carrier media.51 For example, in relation to print media, the activity 
of duplication is printing. This will relate to the act of reproduction as defined by copyright law, 
which concerns material embodiments of the ‘work’. Differently, in relation to electronic media, 
this activity will result in duplication and making available, which relates to the act of public 
communication in copyright law, which concerns immaterial embodiments of the ‘work’. In this, 
we see the summa divisio in categories of acts subject to rightholders’ authorisation to 
controlling tangible vs intangible embodiments. In the current digital age, the relevance of this 
division is questionable. 
In the following sections, we will deal with the different legal categories of acts reserved to 
rightholders that are relevant to media content providers as they refer to: (3.3.1.) acts resulting 
in material embodiments of the protected immaterial good, (3.3.2.) acts resulting in immaterial 
embodiments of the protected immaterial good, (3.3.3.) acts concerning the circulation of 
material embodiments of the protected immaterial good and (3.3.4.) acts concerning the use 
of embodiments of the protected immaterial good. A final section (3.3.5) will provide an 
analysis of digital rights management systems. 
In this analysis we will also discuss applicable exceptions and limitations to the extent that they 
are relevant in the context of value chains relating to media content. We shall assume that 
they are relevant to the extent they have an impact on the use of embodiments of protected 
‘material and immaterial goods’ for personal use. 
 
3.3.1. Acts resulting in material embodiments 
 
Copyright grants rightholders an exclusive power over specific categories of acts which, in 
essence, result in granting rightholders an exclusive power over certain perceptible acts that 
result in a ‘material’ embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial good’. 
The scope of the ‘reproduction’ right results in an exclusive power over certain perceptible acts 
that result in a material embodiment of the protected ‘work’. Making a copy is considered a 
reproduction. 52  This means that the authorisation of the author is required. 
This concept covers temporary or permanent reproductions by any means and in any form, in 
whole or in part. 53  The exclusive right of reproduction also extends to derivative works, 
including translations.54 
The interpretations given to the abovementioned categories of acts will be analysed below to 
demonstrate to what extent they result in granting rightholders an exclusive power over certain 
perceptible acts that result in a material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial good’. First 
                                                
51 M. WÖSSNER, “The Media: An industry with Tradition at the Crossroads” in A. VIZJAK and M. 
RINGSLETTER (eds.), Media Management: Leveraging Content for Profitable Growth, Heidelberg, 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2003, p. 20 
52 See: Cass. 27 mei 2005, IRDI 2005, 267, noot VANOVERMEIRE 
53 See: Art. XI.165, § 1, indent 1 WER 
54 See: Art. XI.165, § 1, indent 2 WER 
18 
(3.3.1.1.), we will examine the general type of acts to which the abovementioned legal 
categories of acts refer to. Second (3.3.1.2.), we will discuss the circumstances that determine 
whether perceptible acts of the general type referred to by the abovementioned legal 
categories of acts are actually reserved to rightholders.  
 
3.3.1.1 Relevant acts reserved to the rightholder: Reproduction 
 
‘Reproduction’ refers to acts that result in ‘material’ embodiments of the protected ‘immaterial 
good’. ‘Material’ embodiments are commonly understood as ‘tangible’ embodiments.55 They 
refer to every direct or indirect56 duplication, in whole or in part, with a temporary or permanent 
‘material’ result, regardless of the process used.57 Reproduction is usually also taken to cover 
acts which alter the protected embodiment of a work (e.g. adaptations, translations, …). 
 
3.3.1.2. Qualifying as the legal categories of acts reserved to the rightholder:  
 
The reproduction right does not constitute an absolute right. Whether a particular perceptible 
act of ‘reproduction’ may actually fall under the control of the rightholder will depend on the 
existence and application of statutory exceptions that the legislator has adopted in respect of 
the reproduction right. In this regard, there are indeed some exceptions of particular relevance 
to media content providers, such as (i) the exception concerning temporary acts of 
reproduction and (ii) the exceptions concerning reproductions for private purposes. 
 
Temporary acts of reproduction 
 
Copyright law stipulates that the rightholder cannot prohibit temporary acts of reproduction 
which are transient or incidental and which are an integral and essential part of a technological 
process and whose sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between third parties 
by an intermediary or a lawful use of a protected work, as long as these acts have no 
independent economic significance.58  
                                                
55 See, for example: F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 9 
56 Here we note that these notions ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ are to be understood in the specific way in which 
copyright delimits the physical scope of the ‘object’ of the exclusive right which they grant. In this regard, 
we refer to the discussion above on the way in which these intellectual property right delimit the physical 
scope of this ‘object’. 
57 See: Art. XI.165, § 1, indent 1 WER. See M-C JANSSENS “Implementation of the 2001 Copyright 
Directive in Belgium”, IIC (International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law/Max Planck 
Institute for IP), 2006, p. 50. Compare also CJEU 5 March 2009, C545/07 (Apis-Hristovich v. Lakorda), 
para 43-44 
58 Art. XI.189, § 3 WER (As the above is not an official translation of this provision we also add the 
official dutch version: “De auteur kan zich niet verzetten tegen tijdelijke reproductiehandelingen van 
voorbijgaande of bijkomstige aard die een integraal and essentieel onderdeel vormen van een technisch 
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This exception takes into account a technological need of reproductions that are necessary 
within most digital equipment for it to function normally. It is accepted that this exception should 
make it possible, inter alia, to perform certain acts of browsing and caching, without prior 
permission of the rightholder. However, even acts of browsing and caching will have to meet 
all condition set out by this exception.59  
The criteria to determine the applicability and the scope of this exception are subject to strong 
debate and have been the subject of several CJEU preliminary rulings. First, ‘temporary’ 
applies to situations where the cache is deleted after leaving the site, or replaced by other files 
after a certain time.60 Second, ‘Transient’ is defined as a duration limited to the time of 
completion of the technological process, which has to be automated, not exceeding what is 
necessary, and not dependant on human intervention, 61  but may be preceded by it. 62 
‘Incidental’ means that it cannot exist independently or with a purpose independent of the 
process it is part of. Third, ‘part of a technological process’ means that the reproduction is 
carried out entirely in the context of a technological process and is necessary for the 
technological process to function.63 Fourth, the ‘sole purpose’ has to be a lawful use, which 
has been held to mean that it must be authorised by the rightholder or not restricted by the 
applicable legislation. 64  Last, the reproduction cannot have ‘independent economic 
significance’. A reproduction will not have independent economic significance as long as it 
does not enable the generation of any additional profit to the user that goes beyond that derived 
from a lawful use of the protected work and do not lead to any modification of such work. It can 
however have economic value.65 
                                                
procédé dat wordt toegepast met als enig doel: de doorgifte in een netwerk tussen derden door een 
tussenpersoon; of een rechtmatig gebruik, van een beschermd werk, waarbij die handelingen geen 
zelfstandige economische waarde bezitten.” See also: CJEU 16 July 2009, Infopaq I, C-5/08; CJEU 4 
October 2011, C-403/08 & C-429/08 (Premier League); CJEU 17 January 2012, C-302/10 (Infopaq II), 
para 25 ff; CJEU 5 June 2014, C-360/13 (PRCA) 
59 See: recital 33 InfoSoc Directive; HvJ (4e k.) nr. C-360/13, 5 June 2014 (Public Relations Consultants 
Association / Newspaper Licensing Agency), RW 2014-15 (weergave TANGHE, Y.), afl. 29, 1154. For 
instance, in a Belgian case involving Google, it was ruled that an act of caching did not comply with this 
exception requirements, as the reproduction was not necessary nor transient and required human 
intervention to delete (see Brussel (9e k.) nr. 2007/AR/1730, 5 mei 2011, IRDI 2011, afl. 3, 275 ff). 
60 CJEU 5 June 2014, C-360/13 (PRCA), para 26 
61 CJEU 16 July 2009, C-5/08 (Infopaq I), para 61 ff 
62 CJEU 5 June 2014, C-360/13 (PRCA), para 26, para 39 ff 
63 CJEU 17 January 2012, C-302/10 (Infopaq II), para 30 ff; CJEU 5 June 2014, C-360/13 (PRCA), para 
28 ff 
64 See, with regard to this debate, for example: CJEU 16 July 2009, C-5/08 (Infopaq International v. 
Danske Dagblades Forening), para 64 ff.; CJEU 17 January 2012, C-302/10 (Infopaq II); S. CLARK, 
“Just browsing? An analysis of the reasoning underlying the Court of Appeal's decision on the temporary 
copies exemption in Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV”, E.I.P.R. 2011, p. 727 
and S. DUSOLLIER, Droit d'Auteur et Protection des Oeuvres dans l'Univers Numérique. Droits et 
Exceptions à la Lumière des Dispositifs de Verrouillage des Oeuvres, Brussel, Larcier, 2005, p. 363 
65 CJEU 4 October 2011, C-403/08 & C-429/08 (Premier League) and 17 January 12, C-302/10 (Infopaq 
II). 
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Reproductions for private purposes  
 
Belgian Copyright Law includes two types of exceptions that allow the use of protected content 
for private purposes. A distinction is made between acts of reproduction on paper using any 
kind of photographic or similar technique (reprography) and any other act of reproduction 
(home-copying). 
Firstly, copyright explicitly provides that, once a ‘work’ has been lawfully66  published, its 
rightholder may not prohibit the reproduction in part or in whole of articles or works of plastic 
arts, or of short fragments of works, which are made on paper or any similar medium, effected 
by the use of any kind of photographic technique or by some other process having similar 
effects when the reproduction is intended for private use and does not prejudice the normal 
exploitation of the work.67  
Secondly, copyright law also states that, once a ‘work’ has been lawfully published, its 
rightholder may not prohibit the reproduction of works on any medium made within the family 
circle and only intended therefore.68 Under this exception, the user can make a reproduction 
of all forms of content provided that it is made in domestic premises (e.g. not at the premises 
of a company or shop) and that it is intended for use in the family (e.g. not for viewing at larger 
party’s). All works and protected subject matter, in their entirety, can be copied using whatever 
means and with no distinctions being made between analogue and digital uses. 
To convey a practical understanding of these exceptions we believe that it is necessary to 
draw specific attention to the following parameters governing their applicability and scope. First 
of all, the applicability of these exceptions is determined by the nature of the medium to which 
the copy is made. The law distinguishes between reproductions (mostly photocopying) on 
paper or similar supports, on the one hand and reproductions on any other media on the other 
hand. For example, the first exception would apply to printing a text from the internet,69 while 
the second relates to the copying of a film, digital book, etc. to a hard drive or other blank 
medium. 
Secondly, we also point out that these exceptions have a different scope as a result of their 
reference to, respectively, ‘private use’ and ‘family circle’. The limits of the ‘family circle’ are 
                                                
66  Compare: CJEU 10 April 2014, C-435/12 (ACI Adam), AM 2014, afl. 5, 369. And Voorz. Kh. 
Antwerpen nr. A/14/01067, 4 November 2014 noot H. HAOUIDEG, S. DEBAENE, L'exception de copie 
privée dans les nuages, IRDI 2014, afl. 4, 689 ff.  
67 Art. XI.190, § 1, 5° WER (As the above is not an official translation of this provision we also add the 
official dutch version: “gedeeltelijke of integrale reproductie op papier of op een soortgelijke drager, van 
artikelen, van werken van beeldende of grafische kunst, of van korte fragmenten uit andere werken, met 
behulp van ongeacht welke fotografische techniek of enige andere werkwijze die een soortgelijk 
resultaat oplevert, met uitzondering van bladmuziek, wanneer die reproductie uitsluitend bestemd is 
voor privégebruik in geen afbreuk doet aan de normale exploitatie van het werk;”) 
68 Art. XI.190, § 1, 9° WER (As the above is not an official translation of this provision we also add the 
official dutch version: “de reproductie op eender welke drager andere dan papier of soortgelijke drager, 
van werken, die in familiekring geschiedt, in alleen daarvoor bestemd is;”  
69 See: CJEU 27 June 2013, C-457/11, C-458/11, C-459/11, C-460/11 (VG Wort) analogue copying 
includes the use of a connected pc and printer 
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exceeded if the duplications can be used by third-parties without family or quasi-family ties.70 
However, the exact and correct interpretation of ‘family circle’ remains unclear outside the 
physical realm, for instance when cloud computing systems are used.71 
On the other hand, the notion of ‘private use’ is usually interpreted broader than the one of 
‘family circle’. For instance, it has been accepted in Belgium that uses within one’s own firm or 
institution can also qualify as ‘private use’.72 However, the compatibility of such interpretations 
with EU acquis remains questionable.73 
 
 
3.3.2. Acts resulting in immaterial embodiments 
 
Copyright law also grants rightholders an exclusive power over certain perceptible acts that 
result in an ‘immaterial’ embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial good’. This includes the rights 
of communication to the public of works and making available to the public other subject-
matter. 
The scope of these rights results from the interpretation of what is an ‘act of performance or 
communication’ and the criterion for being directed at a ‘public’. The interpretation given to 
these two criteria determines the perceptible acts that come within the reach of these acts and 
the questions. Similarly, discussions about delimiting the scope of these rights are based on 
questions and discussions about the interpretation of these criteria. 
 
                                                
70 M.-C. JANSSENS in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 165-166 
71 Compare: Art. 5.2 (b) InfoSoc Directive. And Voorz. Kh. Antwerpen nr. A/14/01067, 4 November 2014, 
noot H. HAOUIDEG, S. DEBAENE, L'exception de copie privée dans les nuages, IRDI 2014, afl. 4, 688 
ff.  
72 See: M.-C. JANSSENS in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 159; Compare also: A. STROWEL 
and B. STROWEL, “la nouvelle législation belge sur le droit d’auteur”, J.T. 1995, p. 125 
73 See, e.g., CJEU 21 October 2010, C-467/08, Padawan/SGAE, 
The exclusive right of reproduction allows media content providers to make the 
reproduction of their contents dependent upon their consent. This applies to acts 
resulting in material embodiments of a work, like e.g. copying a film to a blank DVD. 
However private copying and temporary reproduction exceptions have to be taken into 
account, as they limit the scope of the reproduction right. 
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3.3.2.1. Relevant acts reserved to the rightholder: Communication to the public 
 
‘Communication’ refers to perceptible acts that result in ‘immaterial’ embodiments of the 
protected ‘immaterial good’. Under Belgian law, this includes both ‘performances’ and ‘acts of 
communication’.74 
A ‘performance’ is a perceptible act aimed at conveying a non-material delivery of the ‘work’ 
to people that are present at the place and time where the act takes place (e.g. the act of 
singing a song to an audience in a concert hall).75 Differently, an ‘act of communication’ is a 
perceptible act aimed at conveying a non-material delivery of the ‘work’ to people that are not 
present at the place or time where this act takes place (e.g. the act of providing a radio 
broadcast or an internet stream of a live concert). 
In this regard, ‘immaterial’ embodiments are commonly understood as ‘intangible’ 
embodiments.76 It is generally accepted that the concept of ‘communication’ covers the act 
resulting in an ‘immaterial’ (‘intangible’) rendition of the protected ‘immaterial good’ by any 
means whatsoever.77 
 
3.3.2.2. Qualifying as the legal categories of acts reserved to the rightholder 
 
Whether the acts referred to in the previous section are indeed reserved to the rightholder will 
depend on several factors, namely: the understanding of what constitutes a ‘communication’ 
or ‘performance’ (A.); the notion of a ‘public’ (B.); distinguishing between separate acts of 
communication to the public (C.); and, finally, applicable exceptions (D.). 
 
A. ‘A communication’ or ‘performance’  
 
To qualify as an ‘act of performance or communication’, said act needs certain requirements 
related to the type of perceptible acts that can constitute a ‘communication’ or ‘performance’. 
First, a perceptible act has to convey a non-material embodiment of a ‘work’. This requirement 
is part of the tradition to read a ‘material versus non-material’ dichotomy in the categories of 
acts which copyright makes subject to authorisation by the rightholder. 
According to this dichotomy, ‘performing’ and ‘communicating’ refer only to acts conveying a 
mere non-material embodiment of the ‘work’. On the other hand, this dichotomy understands 
‘reproducing’, ‘distributing’, ‘renting’ and ‘lending’ as only referring to perceptible acts that 
relate to a material embodiment of the ‘work’. The traditional approach to this dichotomy is that 
the material or non-material nature of the perceptible thing embodying the ‘work’ is the sole 
                                                
74 See: F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 16 
75 Compare: CJEU 24 November 2011, C-283/10 (Circul Globus) and Recital 23 Infosoc directive 
76 See: F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 15 
77 See: Art. XI.165, §1 indent 4 WER 
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base to distinguish between material and non-material embodiments. Under this interpretation, 
all the embodiments of a ‘work’ in, amongst others, sound waves, light waves or electrical 
impulses are considered to be non-material embodiments. 78  On the contrary, other 
embodiments of a ‘work’ (for example, on paper or in the semiconductor switches of a 
computer memory) qualify as material embodiments.79 
The second requirement for an act to be a ‘performance or communication’ is that it constitutes 
a conscious act of intervention aimed at conveying people a non-material rendition of a ‘work’. 
The importance of this requirement has been stressed by the CJEU.80 The court has clarified 
that there is a communication where, in the absence of such intervention, people would not be 
able to enjoy the work.81 Such intervention is a conscious one if it was performed in full 
knowledge of the consequences of its action.82 In this regard, although the profit-making nature 
of the act is not a necessary condition for the existence of a communication to the public, it 
can serve as an indication of its nature.83  
The right of communication to the public explicitly includes the making available to the public 
of works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them’.84 This notion is particularly intended to cover interactive on-
demand transmissions, including online dissemination (e.g. streaming 85 ) and Video-on-
Demand systems.86 
                                                
78 See e.g. Joos, “Die Erschöpfungslehre im Urheberrecht. Eine Untersuchung zu Rechtsinhalt und 
Aufspaltbarkeit des Urheberrechts mit vergleichenden Hinweisen auf Warenzeichenrecht, Patentrecht 
und Sortenschutz.”, 8081 (Beck, Munich 1991). 
79 See e.g. Dreier & Schulze, “Urheberrechtsgesetz”, Sec. 16 German Copyright Act, note 7 (Beck, 
Munich 2008). 
80 E.g.: CJEU 13 February 2014, C-466/12 (Svensson), para. 31; CJEU 15 march 2012, C-135/10 (SCF 
v Marco Del Corso), para. 82; CJEU 15 March 2012, C-162/10 (PPL v. Ireland), para. 62-69; CJEU 7 
December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), para 42. 
81 E.g.: CJEU 13 February 2014, C-466/12 (Svensson), para. 31; CJEU 15 March 2012, C-162/10 (PPL 
v. Ireland), para. 62-69; CJEU 4 October 2011, C403/08 and C429/08 (Football Association Premier 
League), para. 194-195. 
82 E.g.: CJEU 15 March 2012, C-135/10 (SCF v Marco Del Corso), para. 82; Compare: CJEU 4 October 
2011, C403/08 and C429/08 (Football Association Premier League), para. 195. CJEU 7 December 
2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), para 42. 
83 Compare: CJEU 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), para. 42.; CJEU 15 March 
2012, C-162/10 (PPL v. Ireland), para 43; CJEU 15 March 2012, C-135/10 (SCF v. Marco Del Corso), 
para 88; CJEU 4 October 2011, C-403/08 and C-429/08 (Football Association Premier League), para 
204. 
84 Art. XI.165, §1 indent 4 WER. 
85 See CJEU 7 March 2013, C‐607/11  (ITV Broadcasting/TvCatchup).  See  also,  regarding  the public 
communication right in an internet context, M‐C JANSSENS, “De impact van het Internet op de sector 
van het auteursrecht (of is het omgekeerd?) – een analyse aan de hand van de rechtspraak van het Hof 
van Justitie”, SEW 2014, p. 454 
86 See, in this regard: M. BORGHI, “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape”, IIC 
2011, p. 316-343 
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B. Directed at a ‘public’  
 
In order to be covered by the concept of ‘communication to the public’, a communication must 
be directed at a public. ‘Public’ can, in essence, be understood as a fairly large and 
indeterminate number of people87 who are not connected by family ties or quasi-family ties.88 
Recipients of a same communication of a ‘work’ will all be taken to belong to the same ‘public’ 
even when they enjoy this communication at different places and different points in time, as 
for instance it can occur with online transmissions of a ‘work’.89  
In this context, the Court of Justice of the European Union has also specified that the public to 
which the communication is directed needs to constitute a new public. In essence, this requires 
a deliberate intervention on the part of the user of the work allowing a public, which was not 
taken into account by the rightholders when authorizing the initial communication, to enjoy the 
‘work’.90  
 
C. Distinguishing between separate acts of communication to the public 
 
The abovementioned criteria for constituting an ‘act of performance or communication’ and for 
being directed at a ‘public’ are also of relevance to distinguish between separate acts of 
communications to the public.  
The question here is whether a second act of communication merely serves to receive the first 
communication or, on the contrary, is to be regarded as a separate act of communication to 
the public (of the same work) for which a separate authorization must be sought. The latter 
case occurs, for instance, in respect of the distribution of a signal by means of television sets 
by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever technique is used to transmit the 
signal.91 
The CJEU has provided a two-step test to tackle this question. This test can be taken to set 
the tone for the way in which the criterion for constituting an ‘act of communication’ and the 
                                                
87 See: CJEU 15 March 2012, C-135/10 (SCF v. Marco Del Corso), para 84 and CJEU 15 March 2012, 
C-162/10 (PPL v. Ireland), para 33  
88 See: Cass. 26 January 2006, R.W. 2006-2007, p. 511; In extenso: G. MOM, “Uitvoering in (strikt) 
besloten kring”, Ami 2010, p. 81-91 
89 See in that sense, for example: F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan 
Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 17 (“Een 
groep gebruikers van het werk moet daarbij niet noodzakelijk samen aanwezig zijn in de ruimte of in de 
tijd om als een publiek te kunnen worden beschouwd.”) 
90 See: CJEU 15 March 2012, C-135/10 (SCF v. Marco Del Corso), para 57 ff.; CJEU 15 March 2012, 
C-162/10 (PPL v. Ireland), para 25 ff.; CJEU 4 October 2011, C-403/08 and C-429/08 (Football 
Association Premier League), para 183 ff (and particularly 197 and the case-law cited) and CJEU 7 
December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), para 32 ff 
91 CJEU 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles) 
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criterion for being directed at a ‘public’ work together to delimit between separate 
communications to the public. 
The first step of the test is to assess whether the intervening perceptible act conveys a non-
material rendition of the ‘work’ to a public that is new compared to the public of the initial 
communication of the ‘work’. For this assessment, the CJEU relies on a normative criterion, 
according to which ‘public’ shall be limited to the relevant public which the rightholder targeted 
and considered when authorising the first communication. This shall consist only of the people, 
within the area of reception of the non-material rendition conveyed by the perceptible act, who 
receive the work either personally or in their own private or family circles.92 
The CJEU takes an intervening perceptible act to do so if it conveys such a rendition of the 
work to an additional relevant public compared to this normatively defined existing relevant 
public of an initial communication to the public.  
The circumstance that people are within the area of reception is not by itself sufficient to 
exclude the existence of a ‘new public’. As long as there is an act without which people would 
be unable to enjoy the works, we will be dealing with a new public. For instance, people 
receiving an unaltered signal in a bar will still constitute a new public compared to people 
receiving the same unaltered signal at home. This is so as, although technically able to receive 
the signal inside the bar, customers will not be able to enjoy the works inside the bar without 
the intervention of its proprietor and have not been taken into account by the rightholders. 
On the contrary, the CJEU does not take an intervening perceptible act to convey a non-
material rendition of the work to a new relevant public if it conveys this rendition to people 
already belonging to the normatively defined existing relevant public of an initial 
communication to the public. This is for example the case for hyperlinks or embedded links 
that refer to an already publicly available (and non-infringing) website.93 It is in reference to this 
specific normative conception of the existing relevant public of the initial communication to the 
public that the CJEU assesses whether an intervening perceptible act conveys a non-material 
rendition of the same work to a new relevant public. 
The second step involves assessing the existence of technical differences between 
perceptible acts which convey the non-material renditions of the ‘work’ to the same relevant 
public. More specifically, it involves assessing whether the second act is not limited to 
maintaining or improving the quality of the reception of the initial act of communication of ‘work’, 
but rather results in a distinct non-material rendition of this ‘work’.94 In the second case (which, 
for instance, would apply when a specific technical means different from that of the original 
communication is used), we will have a separate act of communication to the public of the 
‘work’.95  
                                                
92 E.g.: CJEU 4 October 2011, C-403/08 and C-429/08 (Football Association Premier League), para. 
198; CJEU 7 December 2006, C-306/05 (SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles), para. 41. 
93 CJEU 13 February 2014, C-466/12 (Svensson) and CJEU 21 October 2014, C-248/13 (Bestwater) 
94 CJEU 7 March 2013, C-607/11 (ITV Broadcasting v TV Catch Up), para. 26 and 30-39 
95 CJEU 7 March 2013, C-607/11 (ITV Broadcasting v TV Catch Up), para 40 
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While applying this two-step test to distinguish between different ‘communications to the 
public’, the normative first step has proven to dominate the technical second step.96 If the first 
step reveals that the intervening perceptible act conveys a non-material rendition of the ‘work’ 
to a new relevant public, this finding already determines the outcome of the two-step test. The 
intervening perceptible act will be taken to qualify as a separate act of communication to the 
public of the ‘work’ regardless of whether or not it results in a technically different non-material 
rendition of the ‘work’. The second step of the test only becomes important if the normative 
first step reveals that the intervening perceptible act conveys a non-material rendition of the 
‘work’ to the ‘existing’ relevant public of the initial communication to the public. In that case, 
the second step has to show that the intervening perceptible act results in a technically different 
non-material rendition of the ‘work’ so that the intervening perceptible act qualifies as a 
separate communication to the public.97  
This two-step test used by the CJEU has been the target of criticism.98 One might even get the 
impression that the CJEU chooses to vary the importance of the new public criterion and the 
difference of technical means according to what it considers the appropriate ruling from the 
very outset, i.e. prior to actually performing the abovementioned tests.99 Still, emphasis is 
currently being placed on the first criterion of ‘new public’. 
 
D. Exceptions 
 
Communications to the public will only be under the control of rightholders on the condition 
that no statutory exception can be invoked by the user.  Indeed, in order to constantly monitor 
the balancing mechanism between exclusive rights and the public interest, legislators 
worldwide have adopted a mechanism of exceptions and limitations that is ingrained in the 
copyright system and is of paramount importance for its legitimacy and credibility.100 
 
In the following chapter, we will discuss possibly applicable exceptions to the extent that these 
cover acts concerning embodiments of protected ‘immaterial goods’ for personal use that are 
relevant to media content providers. For the sake of completeness, we observe that also the 
                                                
96 See e.g.: CJEU 13 February 2014, C-466/12 (Svensson) 
97 CJEU 7 March 2013, C-607/11 (ITV Broadcasting v TV Catch Up), para 39 
98 ALAI, Opinion of 17 September 2014 on the criterion “New Public”, developed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), put in the context of making available and 
communication to the public, http://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/2014-opinion-new-
public.pdf 
99  See e.g.: K. KLAFKOWSKA-WAŚNIOWSKA, Under one umbrella Problems of Internet 
Retransmissions of Broadcasts and Implications for New Audiovisual Content Services, 6 (2015) 
JIPITEC 86, para 19. 
100 See Fifth Recital to the WCT. See also M-C JANSSENS, “The issue of exceptions: Reshaping the 
keys to the gates in the territory of literary, musical and artistic creation”, in Derclaye, E. (ed), The Future 
of Copyright Law, Series Research Handbooks in Intellectual Property, Cheltenham UK:Edward Elgar, 
2009, p. 317. 
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exceptions relating to quotation, education and scientific research as well as orphan works 
may be applicable, but they will not be considered in detail hereafter. 
 
Communications free of charge in the family circle 
 
The exception concerning acts of ‘communications to the public’, which, in our opinion, might 
be most relevant to media content providers is the exception in respect of communications 
free of charge in the family circle.101 Under this exception, the reference to the family circle 
reflects the abovementioned requirement that acts constituting a ‘communication’ are aimed 
at a ‘public’ taken into account by the rightholders when they authorised a communication to 
the original public.102 
 
Other possibly relevant exceptions 
 
For the sake of completeness, we observe that some other exceptions may be relevant in the 
context of media services.  
We refer to the exception that allows for ‘quotations’ with no limitations regarding the format 
that can be used. Furthermore, communications to the public (as well as reproduction) of works 
can be made to allow uses for disabled persons103. 
Mention should also be made of the possibilities for educational institutions to make use of 
works to which they have lawfully gained access through an internal network.  This authority 
to perform internal acts of communication is subject to specified conditions. Firstly, such 
communications can only be performed by institutions of education and research officially 
established or recognised as such. Secondly, only acts of communication that occur within the 
framework of the normal activities of the institution are allowed. Finally, these acts are 
restricted to communications over `a closed transmission network’, such as an intranet that 
can only be accessed through user names and passwords. 
Finally, article 22 § 1, 9° provides that "the communication, including the making available to 
individuals, for the purpose of research or private study, of works not subject to purchase or 
licensing terms, which are contained in collections of publicly-accessible libraries, educational 
or research establishments, museums or archives, that do not pursue any commercial or 
economic purpose, whether directly or indirectly, to by dedicated terminals accessible on the 
premises of such establishments". 
                                                
101 See: Art XI.190, 3° WER (“Wanneer het werk op geoorloofde wijze openbaar is gemaakt, kan de 
auteur zich niet verzetten tegen: … de kosteloze privé-uitvoering in;”) 
102 See, for example: M.-C. JANSSENS in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. 
De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 158 
103 See  
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3.3.3. Acts that result in the circulation of material embodiments 
 
Another of the exclusives that is granted to rightholders that is relevant to media content 
providers relates to the circulation of the embodiment. This covers certain perceptible acts that 
result in the transmission of a factual power over an article that contains the protected 
‘immaterial good’.  
In the context of copyright, this includes the ‘distribution’,104 ‘rental’ and ‘lending’105 of originals 
and copies of works. Please note that, in this context of copyright, ‘distribution’ can be taken 
to refer to any form of dissemination to the public of (physical) copies of the ‘work’ by sale or 
otherwise.106 According to the legal definition, ‘lending’ means ‘making available a work for 
use, for a limited period of time and for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage’.107 
On the other hand, ‘lending’ means ‘making available for use, for a limited period of time and 
not for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage, when it is made through 
establishments which are accessible to the public’.108 
We will proceed with an analysis of these categories of acts to demonstrate to extent to which 
they result in granting the rightholder an exclusive power over certain perceptible acts which 
result in passing on, at the least, the factual power over a ‘material embodiment’ of the 
protected ‘immaterial good’. As previously, we will start by examining the general type of 
perceptible acts to which the abovementioned legal categories of acts are taken to refer in 
principle (3.3.3.1). This will be followed by a discussion of the circumstances that determine 
whether perceptible acts of the general type referred to by the abovementioned legal 
categories of acts will actually be reserved to the rightholder under (3.3.3.2). 
                                                
104 Art. XI.165, § 1, indent 5 WER 
105 Art. XI.165, § 1, indent 3 WER 
106 See: art 4.1. InfoSoc Directive 
107  See: art. 2.1., a) Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field 
of intellectual property (codified version) OJ L 376, 27 December 2006, p. 28-35 (Hereinafter: Rental 
and Lending Directive (2006)). 
108 See: art. 2.1., b) Rental and Lending Directive (2006) 
The right of public communication allows media content providers to make the 
communication or performance to a public dependent on their consent. This applies to 
immaterial embodiments of the ‘work’, like e.g. a radiobroadcast or the streaming of 
music or films. The scope of this right has been limited by the CJEU in its understanding 
of the term ‘communication to the public’, implying that a new public is required. 
Therefore, linking and embedding to lawful contents are generally not considered to be 
aimed at a new public, while live streaming using different technical means of 
communication is considered a communication to a public. Under the Belgian law, 
communications in the family circle are exempted. 
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3.3.3.1. Type of perceptible acts referred to by legal categories of acts reserved to the 
rightholder 
 
‘Distribution’, ‘rental’ and ‘lending’ share the fact that they all refer to perceptible acts which 
result in passing on a factual power over a material embodiment of a protected ‘immaterial 
good’. In this regard, ‘material’ embodiments are traditionally understood as being ‘tangible’ 
embodiments.109 However, it should be noted that, in the context of the computer software 
directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union has already indicated that the copy of a 
software made available by means of a download from a website can be covered by the 
distribution right.110 
One can argue that the notions ‘distribution’, ‘rental’ and ‘lending’ refer to the transfer of a 
factual power over a material embodiment under different conditions set out by legal 
agreements governing the actual acts of transferring this factual power. These contractual 
conditions are essentially twofold: first, whether it is agreed that the factual power over the 
embodiment is to be returned after a certain period of time; second, whether the price 
corresponds to the economic value of this embodiment, or, if this is not the case, nevertheless 
amounts to a direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage.111 
‘Distribution’ is traditionally understood as covering perceptible acts which involve the 
transmission of a factual power over a material embodiment of a protected ‘immaterial good’ 
in the context of an agreement in which real property rights are transferred.112 In relation to 
software, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that this covers agreements by 
which, in return of payment, a transfers of rights of ownership in tangible or intangible property 
occurs. This is so independently of the denomination of the agreement as long as there is a 
grant of a right to use a copy of the software, for an unlimited period, in return for payment of 
a fee designed to enable the rightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the 
economic value of said copy.113 Although the facts of this judgement were related to software 
                                                
109 Compare: F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 13 and J. SPOOR, D. VERKADE 
and D. VISSER, Auteursrecht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2005, p. 191 (“Object van verhuur- in leenrecht zijn 
stoffelijke exemplaren van het werk.”) 
110 CJEU 3 July 2012, C-128/11 (UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International), para 47. See also M-C 
JANSSENS, “Chapter 5. The Software Directive 2009/24/EC”, in I. Stamatoudi en P. Torremans 
(eds), EU Copyright Law. A Commentary, Edw. Elgar Publ. Cheltenham, 2014, p. 118. 
111 The relevance of these conditions can be derived from, amongst others: art. 2.1., a.) and art. 2.1., 
b.) Rental and Lending Directive (2006); CJEU 17 April 2008 C456/06 (Peek & Cloppenburg KG v. 
Cassina), para 36 and CJEU 3 July 2012, C-128/11 (UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International), para 44-
46  
112 See: CJEU 17 April 2008 C-456/06 (Peek & Cloppenburg KG v. Cassina), para 36 (“It follows that 
the concept of distribution to the public, otherwise than through sale, of the original of a ‘work’ or a copy 
thereof, for the purpose of Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/29, covers acts which entail, and only acts which 
entail, a transfer of the ownership of that object.”) 
113 See: CJEU 3 July 2012, C-128/11 (UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International), para 44-46 (“44. In this 
respect, it must be observed that the downloading of a copy of a computer program and the conclusion 
of a user licence agreement for that copy form an indivisible whole…. 45. As regards the question 
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copyright, we consider that the principles applicable to transfers of property can be extended 
to situations that involve other subject matters.  
As for ‘rental’ and ‘lending’, they are traditionally understood as perceptible acts which involve 
the transmission of a factual power over a material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial 
good’ in the context of an agreement which indicates that merely the factual power is 
transferred and that the same shall be returned after a limited period of time.114 While ‘rental’ 
refers to acts with direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage,115 ‘lending’ refers to 
acts that do not aim at a direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage made through 
establishments accessible to the public.116 
 
3.3.3.2. Qualifying as the legal categories of acts reserved to the rightholder 
 
Whether perceptible acts of the type referred to by the abovementioned legal categories of 
acts, namely ‘distribution’, ‘rental’ and ‘lending’, will actually be reserved to the rightholder will 
depend on the application – or not – of the exhaustion of the right. 
 
Exhaustion 
 
The exhaustion of the right constitutes a general ‘limitation’ to the sort of perceptible acts over 
which IP rights grant an exclusive power to the rightholder.117 In essence, it entails that once 
                                                
whether, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the commercial transactions 
concerned involve a transfer of the right of ownership of the copy of the computer program, it must be 
stated that, according to the order for reference, a customer of Oracle who downloads the copy of the 
program and concludes with that company a user licence agreement relating to that copy receives, in 
return for payment of a fee, a right to use that copy for an unlimited period. The making available by 
Oracle of a copy of its computer program and the conclusion of a user licence agreement for that copy 
are thus intended to make the copy usable by the customer, permanently, in return for payment of a fee 
designed to enable the copyrightholder to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic value 
of the copy of the ‘work’ of which it is the proprietor. 46. In those circumstances, the operations 
mentioned in paragraph 44 above, examined as a whole, involve the transfer of the right of ownership 
of the copy of the computer program in question.”) 
114 See: art. 2.1., a.) and b.) Rental and Lending Directive (2006) 
115 See: art. 2.1., a.) Rental and Lending Directive (2006) 
116 See: art. 2.1., b) Rental and Lending Directive (2006) 
117 For the distinction between a ‘limitation’ and an ‘exception’, see for example: S. DUSOLLIER, Droit 
d'Auteur et Protection des Oeuvres dans l'Univers Numérique. Droits et Exceptions à la Lumière des 
Dispositifs de Verrouillage des Oeuvres, Brussel, Larcier, 2005, p. 426 (“Nous recourrons au terme d' 
"exceptions" pour désigner l'ensemble des utilisations d'une oeuvre protégée dans lesquelles s'efface 
le droit exclusif de l'auteur. Par contre l'expression "limitations" rend souvent comptes des situations 
dans lesquelles il n'y a pas de droit d'auteur, in raison de l'expiration de la durée de protection, de 
l'absence de l'originialité ou de la définition de l'étendue des droits.”); A. LUCAS and H.-J. LUCAS, 
Traité de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, Paris, Litec, 2001, p.251; For a qualification of the 
exhaustion rule as a ‘limitation’ rather than an ‘exception’ in the sense just mentioned, see for example: 
U. JOOS, Die Erschöpfungslehre im Urheberrecht. Eine Untersuchung zu Rechtsinhalt und 
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a rightholder directly or indirectly places in the market a material embodiment of the protected 
‘immaterial good’, it can no longer resort to his exclusive right to control acts concerning this 
specific embodiment.118 
For example, once a rightholder has sold a copy of his copyright protected novel, the exclusive 
power which copyright gives him to control the ‘distribution’ of embodiments of his novel will 
no longer extend to the resale of that particular copy. However, his exclusive power to control 
the ‘distribution’ of embodiments of this novel still extends to other copies. 
The requirements for the exhaustion of the right (1.) and the scope of the exhaustion rule (2.) 
will be discussed below. 
 
1. Conditions for the exhaustion rule to apply 
 
For the distribution right to be exhausted, a material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial 
good’ (1.1.) needs to have been ‘put into circulation’ by the rightholder or with his consent 
(1.2.).  
 
1.1. Material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial good’ 
 
In principle, exhaustion only applies to a material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial 
good’. The traditional view has been that a material embodiment shall be understood as a 
‘tangible’ embodiment and that, therefore, the exhaustion rule cannot apply to digital 
embodiments of the protected ‘immaterial good’ which are disseminated online, as opposed to 
on a tangible memory medium, such as a CD-ROM.119  
However, several legal scholars have argued that the exhaustion rule should also apply to 
digital embodiments of the protected ‘immaterial good’ which are spread online in the form of 
                                                
Aufspaltbarkeit des Urheberrechts mit vergleichenden Hinweisen auf Warenzeichenrecht, Patentrecht 
und Sortenschutz, München, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991, p.77 (“Die Erschöpfung ist 
eine dem Verbreitungsrecht immanente Inhaltsbeschränkung, eine Begrenzung des sachlichen oder 
materiellen Gehalts des Verbreitungsrechts.”) 
118  See: V. VAN OVERMEIRE, "Enkel de communautaire uitputting van het distributierecht is 
toegestaan" noot bij CJEU 12 September 2006, C479/04 (Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet), A&M 
2007, p. 74-78; M. VIVANT, Le droit des brevets, Parijs, Éditions Dalloz, 2005, p. 97 ff.; R. HILTY, "Der 
Softwarevertrag - ein Blick in die Zukunft - Konsequenzen der trägerlosen Nutzung und des 
patentrechtlichen Schutzes von Software", MMR 2003, p. 9 ff.; R. SACK, "Der Erschöpfungsgrundsatz 
im deutschen Immaterialgüterrecht", GRUR Int 2000, p. 610 ff.; M. BUYDENS, Droit des brevets 
d'invention et protection du savoir-faire, Brussel, Larcier, 1999, p. 257; U. JOOS, Die Erschöpfungslehre 
im Urheberrecht. Eine Untersuchung zu Rechtsinhalt und Aufspaltbarkeit des Urheberrechts mit 
vergleichenden Hinweisen auf Warenzeichenrech, Patentrecht und Sortenschutz, München, C.H. 
Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991, p. 30 ff.; C. SCHRAMM, Grundlagenforscung auf dem Gebiete 
des gewerblichen rechtsschutzes und Urheberrechtes, Berlin – Köln, C. Heymanns Verlag KG, 1954, 
p. 376; Zie ook: B. CONDE CALLEGO, "The Principle of Exhaustion of Rights and Its Implications for 
Competition Law", IIC 2003, p. 474 ff. 
119 See, for example: H. SCHACK, "Rechtsprobleme der Online-Übermittlung", GRUR 2007, p.643 
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‘downloads’.120 In the context of computer software, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
has meanwhile ruled that, under certain circumstances, the exhaustion rule can in fact apply 
to digital embodiments of a computer program which are made available by means of a 
download from a website.121 
Still, the Software Directive is a lex specialis122 in relation to the InfoSoc directive.123 The 
InfoSoc Directive (and, in particular, Recitals 28 and 29) clearly differentiate between tangible 
and intangible goods, the latter not being subject to exhaustion. As such, the reasoning 
followed by the CJEU in Usedsoft does not seem applicable to subject matters other than 
computer software. 
 
1.2. Put into circulation by the rightholder or with his consent 
 
The exhaustion rule can only apply to a material embodiment of the protected ‘immaterial good’ 
if this material embodiment was ‘put into circulation’ by the rightholder or with his consent.124  
It is important to know: (i) whether the mere fact of the rightholder consenting to passing on 
factual power over the material embodiment counts as ‘putting into circulation’ by him or with 
his consent, or (ii) whether ‘putting into circulation’ by him or with his consent requires that 
passing on the factual power over the material embodiment is governed by a specific legal 
agreement, namely an agreement transferring real property rights over this embodiment. 
It is traditionally understood that ‘putting into circulation’ by the rightholder or with his consent, 
requires a transfer of real property rights over the material embodiment of the protected 
‘immaterial good’.125 Considering this, no exhaustion occurs in relation to renting, lending and 
licencing since the material embodiment is not ‘put into circulation’. 
 
                                                
120 See, for example: M. BORGHI, “Chasing Copyright Infringement in the Streaming Landscape”, IIC 
2011, p. 316-343 and B. KNIES, "Erschöpfung Online? - Die aktuelle Problematik beim On-Demand-
Vertrieb von Tonträgern im Lichte der Richtlinie zur Informationsgesellschaft", GRUR Int. 2002, p. 314-
317 
121 CJEU 3 July 2012, C-128/11 (UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International), para 47 ff. 
122 CJEU 3 July 2012, C-128/11 (UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International), para 56. M-C JANSSENS, 
“Chapter 5. The Software Directive 2009/24/EC”, in I. Stamatoudi en P. Torremans (eds), EU Copyright 
Law. A Commentary, Edw. Elgar Publ. Cheltenham, 2014, p. 91 
123  Compare however: In the case of eBooks, Pro: Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 20 January 2015, 
Computerrecht 2015/45, noot J.G. VAN OLST; Contra: Landesgericht Bielefeld, 5 March 2013, Case 
No 4 O 191/11 
124 See: art IX.165, § 1, indent 6 WER 
125 Compare: art. XI.165, § 1, indent 6 WER; See for example: CJEU 12 September 2006, C-479/04 
(Laserdisken v. Kulturministeriet), para 20 (“According to that provision, the distribution right is not to be 
exhausted in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of 
ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent.”) 
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2. Scope of exhaustion 
 
It should be noted that a right is only exhausted in relation to the specific material embodiment 
which fulfils all requirements for the applicability of the rule. This means that if one particular 
copy of a novel can be taken to fulfil these requirements, ‘exhaustion’ will only extend to this 
particular copy and has no implication for other copies of the novel. 
Additionally, ‘exhaustion’ only extends to the specific legal categories of acts reserved to the 
rightholder which are taken to fall within the scope of the ‘rule. Only the distribution right is 
subject to exhaustion. 
In this regard, we note that the Court of Justice of the European Union applied an important 
reasoning to avoid that ‘exhaustion’ concerning digital embodiments would be without practical 
significance for an online dissemination of such embodiments. The background here is the 
‘transmission-by-duplication’ technique used to send digital embodiments online. With this 
‘transmission-by-duplication’ technique we refer to the fact that sending a digital file from 
computer A to computer B, is in fact technically done by letting computer B make a duplication 
of the digital file found in computer A. Considering that the exhaustion rule does not extend to 
acts involving ‘reproductions’ of the protected ‘immaterial good’ this would mean that the 
exhaustion rule could not apply to passing on digital embodiments online because of the 
duplications which they technically entail. 
Finally, ‘exhaustion' has a territorial character, which means that it applies only to copies 
placed on the market inside the European Economic Area (EU member states plus Iceland, 
Lichtenstein and Norway).126 EU Member States are precluded from adopting national or 
international exhaustion rules.127 
 
 
 
3.3.4. Acts related to the use of embodiments 
 
Copyright does not mention ‘use’ as a category of acts reserved to the rightholder. Hence, 
copyright does not allow rightholders to exercise control over the mere ‘use’ of the 
                                                
 126 Compare: art. XI1.165, § 1, indent 6 WER; See for example: CJEU 12 September 2006, C-479/04 
(Laserdisken v. Kulturministeriet) 
127  F. GOTZEN in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 13-14 
The right to authorise that material embodiments like e.g. CD’s be brought into 
circulation, allows media content providers to control the dissemination of the work. This 
allows them to market their CD’s e.g. in the US, while preventing their import in the EU. 
The scope of this right is however limited by the fact that once the CD has been rightfully 
put on the EU market, the exhaustion rule applies and the rightholder can no longer 
control its distribution. It is currently accepted that this rule only applies to material 
embodiments, meaning that for distribution of immaterial embodiments (e.g. circulation 
of digital mp3 files online) consent of the rightholder will always be required. 
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embodiment. It is even considered a fundamental principle that the existing rights cannot result 
in granting an exclusive power over the mere consumption of an ‘immaterial good’.128 
However, in practice, we find that copyright does not, as a matter of principle, refrain from 
letting the categories of acts reserved to the rightholder result in a de facto control over the 
use of digital embodiments of the protected ‘immaterial goods’. On the one hand, the 
reproduction right is broadly interpreted. On the other hand, the use of digital embodiments 
requires duplications that are technically indispensable (for instance, reproductions are 
needed for a computer to run or to display an image on the computer screen). This results in 
the reproduction right covering the duplications of digital embodiments of protected ‘immaterial 
goods’ that are technically indispensable to use the work. 
Considering the above, copyright will only refrain from attributing the rightholder a de facto 
control over the use of digital embodiments of protected ‘immaterial goods’ to the extent that 
the duplications involved in these acts falls within the scope of explicit exceptions concerning 
‘reproduction’.129 In this regard, particular attention should devoted to the exception concerning 
temporary acts of reproduction. However, in practice, as it results from the observations 
previously made in relation to the applicability and the scope of this exception, acts of using 
embodiments of the protected ‘immaterial good’ can in certain cases surpass the ambit of 
these exceptions. 
 
3.3.5. Circumvention of Digital Rights Management systems 
 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems to protect works and control their use through a 
technical protection scheme do not constitute a type of perceptible act reserved to rightholders. 
Instead, they are merely technical measures that can be incorporated within the embodiment 
of the work. The technology aims to prevent unauthorised acts by resorting to technical means 
rather than (only) legal provisions.130 Specific legal protection has been granted to these 
technical means in order to prevent the circumvention of DRM technology.131  
In practice, if a DRM scheme is deployed, rightholders can benefit from three layers of 
protection.132 The first layer of protection results from copyright and related rights. This can be 
                                                
128 See in this regard, for example: S. DUSOLLIER, Droit d'Auteur et Protection des Oeuvres dans 
l'Univers Numérique. Droits et Exceptions à la Lumière des Dispositifs de Verrouillage des Oeuvres, 
Brussel, Larcier, 2005, p. 329; J. BOYLE, "Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property", Vand. L. Rev. 2000, p. 2008 
129 Compare for example: T. DREIER, “The Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs”, E.I.P.R. 1991, p. 322 (“Since the restricted acts are so broadly defined in Article 
4(a) and (b), it has been necessary to provide for certain exceptions in order not to subject the normal 
use of a computer program to a virtually unlimited number of authorisations by the rightholder.”) 
130 See: S. MICHIELS, W. JOOSEN, E. TRUYEN and K. VERSLYPE, Digital Rights Management - A 
Survey of Existing Technologies, Leuven, Department of Computer Science (K.U.Leuven), CW Reports 
vol: CW428 2005, p. 4 
131 See: Art. XI.291 and XI.292 WER 
132 P. WAND, “Dreifach genäht hält besser! - Technische Identifizierungs- und Schutzsysteme”, GRUR 
Int 1996, p. 897-905 
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compared to the legal prohibition to steal bikes. The second layer of protection is the protection 
derived from DRM-systems that prevents unauthorised acts. This can be compared to a bicycle 
lock preventing people from stealing a bike. The third layer is composed of the legal protection 
granted to DRM-systems themselves based on 'effective technological measures’ and ‘rights-
management information’ as described in Book XI, title 5, chapter 12 of the WER. This can be 
compared to the legal prohibition to opening bicycle locks of others. 
 
3.3.5.1. Technological Protection Measures and Rights-Management Information 
 
The protection resulting from the law applies only to DRM systems that concern 'effective 
technological measures’ and ‘rights-management information’. Both notions are aptly 
described in the legal provisions.133 
 
A. Technological Protection Measures 
 
Legal protection is only granted to ‘effective technological measures’.134 They are described 
as any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed 
to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of embodiments of the protected immaterial good, which 
are not authorised by the rightholder.135 
The use of these measures is ‘efficient’ if the use of the embodiment of the immaterial good is 
controlled through the application of an access control or protection process, such as 
encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject-matter or a copy 
control mechanism, which achieves the protection objective. 136  The notion of ‘effective 
technological measures’ is seen as a technology neutral concept.137 It is assumed that the list 
of techniques only creates a presumption that the same will be effective. It does not provide 
an exhaustive enumeration.138 However, the law establishes certain functional criteria, to 
accept that a component of a DRM-system is an ‘effective technological measures’. 
First, in the course of its normal operations, the involved component has to serve to prevent 
or limit unauthorised acts in relation to embodiments of the protected immaterial good.139 This 
                                                
133 See art. XI.291, § 1 art. XI.292, § 2 WER 
134 See: Art. I.13 and XI.281, § 1, indent 1 WER 
135 See: Art. I.13, 7° WER, Official dutch text: "technologie, inrichtingen of onderdelen die in het kader 
van hun normale werking dienen voor het voorkomen of beperken van handelingen ten aanzien van 
werken of prestaties of databanken, die door de houders van auteursrechten of naburige rechten of 
producenten van databanken niet zijn toegestaan." 
136 See: Art. XI.281, § 1, indent 3 WER 
137 Compare, e.g.: A. WANDTKE and C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. 
WANDTKE in W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 12 
138 See e.g.: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON in H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p.553 
139 See: Art. I.13, 7° WER 
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indicates ‘what’ (the ‘work’ or ‘performance’) the component has to protect and 'against whom’ 
it acts (the user) to be able to qualify as an ‘effective technological measure’. It is assumed 
that a component of a DRM-system can also qualify as an ‘effective technological measure’ if 
it does not just intervene to the benefit of the embodiments of the protected immaterial 
goods.140 No special normative significance is attached to the expression “in the normal course 
of its operation”.141  
It is questionable whether DRM-systems can be qualified as ‘technological measures’ if they 
prevent acts not restricted by copyright (e.g. simple access) or in relation to works that are not 
subject to copyright protection (e.g. after the term of the copyright length). The wording of the 
legal provisions would indicate that is the case. However, many commentators argue that the 
protection of DRM-systems should not extend so far.142 
A second functional requirement is that the technological measures have to be ‘effective’. The 
technological measures allow the rightholder to control the use of embodiments of the involved 
immaterial good, through applying control to the access or protection process that actually 
obtains the envisioned protection. 143  Effectiveness does not require an impossibility to 
circumvent the technological measures. It mostly requires that the ‘control’ offered by 
technological measures reaches a certain minimum standard.144 It cannot entail technological 
measures that are too easily circumvented, e.g. by pressing a simple button, so that they 
essentially become a mere (formal) prohibition by the rightholder.145 This minimum standard is 
to be evaluated from the perspective of a normal user, not the one of an experienced hacker.146 
Courts have previously decided that a technological measure is no longer efficient because 
the software to circumvent it is widely spread.147 
 
                                                
140 See e.g.: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 550 
141  Compare: A. WANDTKE in C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. 
WANDTKE in W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, 
randnummer 43 ff 
142 See e.g.: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 551-552 
143 See: Art. XI.281, § 1, indent 3 WER 
144 See e.g.: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 553 and A. WANDTKE 
and C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. WANDTKE and W. BULLINGER, 
Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 47 
145  See e.g.: A. WANDTKE and C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. 
WANDTKE in W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 47 (“Es 
darf sich nicht um Sperren handeln, die derart leicht auszuschalten sind, dass sie lediglich auf ein Verbot 
des Rechtsinhabers hinauslaufen” 
146 See e.g.: A. WANDTKE in C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. WANDTKE 
and W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 50 
147 See: Tingsrätt Helsinki 25 mei 2007 (R 07/1004), available at http://www.oikeus.fi 
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B. Rights-Management Information 
 
The law also provides protection to ‘rights-management information’.148 This notion is delimited 
by functional and technological requirements. 
The functional requirement states that it has to concern ‘information’ that either, allows the 
identification of the embodiment of the protected immaterial good, or indicates the conditions 
applicable to the use the embodiment of the immaterial good.149 
The technological requirements demand that i) the incorporation of said information has to be 
electronic,150 and ii) the incorporation of that information has to be physically connected to the 
embodiment of the protected immaterial good.151 The first requirement results in the necessity 
to save said information by electronic means.152  
The requirement of physical connection to the embodiment of the protected immaterial good 
does not demand that the involved ‘rights-management information’ must be visible.153 For 
instance, an invisible digital watermark could qualify as ‘rights-management information’ for 
some media content. However, this requires the incorporation of information into the digital 
files that either identifies the file as an embodiment of the protected immaterial good, identifies 
its authors or other rightholders or indicates the conditions for the use of the file.154 
 
3.3.5.2. The legal protection offered to Technological Protection Measures and Rights-
Management Information 
 
The components of DRM-systems that entail ‘efficient technological measures’ or ‘rights-
management information’ can benefit from legal protection. This mainly consists of the 
prohibition to circumvent and delete ‘efficient technological measures' or 'rights-management 
information’. The scope of this protection will be discussed in detail. 
 
                                                
148 See: Art. XI.292 WER 
149 See: Art. XI.292, §2, indent 1 WER; See also: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES 
(eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 
2012, p. 559-560 
150 This follows from: Art. XI.292, §1, indent 1, 1° WER 
151 This follows from: Art. XI.292, §1, indent 2 WER (“…, wanneer bestanddelen van deze informatie zijn 
verbonden met een kopie van een werk of prestatie of kenbaar worden bij de mededeling aan het publiek 
ervan.”) 
152  See e.g.: A. WANDTKE and C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. 
WANDTKE in W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 12 
153 See e.g.: A. WANDTKE in C. OHST, “UrhG § 95 a Schutz technischer Maßnahmen” in A. WANDTKE 
in W. BULLINGER, Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht, München, Beck, 2009, nr. 13 
154 See: Art. XI.293, §2, indent 1 WER; See also: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES 
(eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 
2012, p. 559-560 
38 
A. Technological Protection Measures 
 
The legal protection offered by copyright for ‘efficient technological measures’ entails two 
components: i) a prohibition to circumvent the ‘efficient technological measures’155 and ii) a 
prohibition to offer means that are aimed at circumventing ‘efficient technological measures’.156 
The first component of protection is the prohibition against acts of circumventing ‘efficient 
technological measures’. These are even considered criminal offences given certain 
circumstances, namely the fact that the person knows or reasonably should know that he is 
circumventing ‘efficient technological measures’ and the fact that the person also has 
knowledge that by circumventing he is facilitating certain offences.157 
The second component is the prohibition to offer means that are expectable to be aimed at 
circumventing ‘efficient technological measures’. These acts are also criminal offences, and 
are described in great detail in order to prevent that ‘innocent’ devices would fall under this 
prohibition.158 
 
B. Rights-Management information 
 
The legal protection granted to ‘rights-management information’ also entails two components: 
i) a prohibition to delete or alter ‘rights-management information’ of the embodiment of the 
immaterial good 159  and ii) a prohibition to, in a broad sense, circulate or display the 
embodiments of the immaterial good of which the ‘rights-management information’ has been 
removed or altered without authority.160 
Once again, the law prescribes this prohibition by referring to the fact that committing these 
acts can entail a criminal offence. And, once again, it is required that the person committing 
the act, is aware of the fact that his actions encourage the infringement of copyright or related 
rights, or enables, facilitates or conceals that infringement.161 
 
                                                
155 See: Art. XI.291, §1, indent 1 WER  
156 See: Art. XI.291, §1, indent 2 WER  
157 See: Art. XI.291, §1, indent 1 in fine WER  
158 See: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische 
auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 549-550 
159 See: Art. XI.292, §1, indent 1, 1° WER 
160 See: Art. XI.292, §1, indent 1, 2° WER 
161 See: Art. XI.292, §1, indent 2 WE; See also: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), 
Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, 
p. 549-550 
39 
3.3.5.3. Limits to the use of Technological Protection Measures 
 
The rules concerning ‘efficient technological measures’ and ‘rights-management information’ 
prescribe certain obligations in relation to the use of DRM-systems. These obligations are 
offered to cover the possibility for ‘lawful users’, despite the application of DRM, being able to 
perform the acts concerning the embodiments of the immaterial good that are necessary for: 
i) use according to the envisioned objective162 and ii) the actual benefit of certain, legally 
provided exceptions.163  
The law provides a general obligation for DRM systems. They cannot prevent the lawful 
acquirer from using his embodiment according to their ‘envisioned objective’.164 The precise 
scope of this provision raises questions. Firstly, the interpretation of the notions ’lawful 
acquirer’ and ‘envisioned objective’ is not clear. For a ‘Lawful acquirer’, it can be asked how to 
obtain this position? Is this only possible in case of a license by the rightholder, in case of a 
direct agreement with the rightholder in the context of obtaining the embodiment of the 
immaterial good, or in case of acquiring the embodiment where exhaustion applies? In relation 
to ‘envisioned objective’, the question rises whether this objective is to be determined in light 
of the envisioned objective that resulted in acquiring the embodiment or based on objective 
criteria, e.g. physical attributes of the obtained material embodiment of the immaterial good.165  
Further, there are discussions surrounding the balance between the obligation to guarantee 
specific exceptions and the obligation to guarantee use according to the ‘envisioned objective’. 
Some authors suggest that an obligation to guarantee the use of non-listed specific exceptions 
where they align with the ‘envisioned use’ can derive directly from the general obligation.166 
This would result in an obligation to the rightholder not to hinder the use for the ‘envisioned 
objective’ of lawful embodiments of the involved immaterial goods obtained even in the context 
of on-demand media content. Consequently, the interpretation of 'envisioned objective’ 
becomes very important.167 Still, other authors argued that this is a moot point and that the 
general obligation to allow use for ‘envisioned goal’ cannot go against the explicit provision 
stating the exceptions that must be guaranteed.168 Following this reasoning, it would be right 
to assume that the general obligation of guaranteeing use for the ‘envisioned objective’ against 
DRM-systems would not apply in the case of on-demand media content. 
Second, the law provides that rightholders have to take sufficient voluntary measures to ensure 
that lawful users of the embodiments of the immaterial good are enabled to perform certain 
acts that are exceptions to the categories of acts that are subject to the authorisation of the 
                                                
162 See: Art. XI.292, §4 WER 
163 See: Art. XI.292, §2 WER 
164 See: Art. XI.291, §4 WER 
165 Compare: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 556-557 
166 See: J. DEENE and K. VAN DER PERRE, “Nieuwe Auteurswet”, N.J.W. 2005, p. 886 ff 
167 See e.g.: J. DEENE and K. VAN DER PERRE, “Nieuwe Auteurswet”, N.J.W. 2005, p.886 ff 
168 See e.g.: F. BRISON and B. MICHAUX, “La nouvelle loi du 22 mai 2005 adapte le droit d’auteur au 
numérique”, A&M 2005, p. 221 
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rightholder. Essentially, perceptible acts concerning embodiments that fall within the scope of 
certain exceptions, cannot be prohibited through DRM-systems, at least not for lawful users.169 
If rightholders do not voluntarily, within a reasonable term, take the appropriate measures to 
assure the lawful users the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, users can 
bring an action to force them to (the possibility of self-help by users is excluded by the law).170 
The obligation only applies to certain specific exceptions that are expressly listed in the 
provision.171 The listed exceptions are quite limited172 and exist only in relation to persons who 
have lawfully obtained access to the embodiment of the immaterial good. As discussed above, 
the exact meaning of ‘lawful user’ is unclear.173 Further, the obligation does not exist for 
embodiments of immaterial goods that are available on-demand where such services are 
governed by contractual arrangements. 174  In these cases, rightholders do not have to 
guarantee the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation. 
  
                                                
169 See e.g.: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 554 ff 
170 See in relation to the above mentioned action and the persons entitled to invoke them: Art. XI.336 
WER 
171 See in this case: Art. XI.291, §2, indent 1 WER (“De rechthebbenden nemen binnen een redelijke 
termijn afdoende vrijwillige maatregelen, waaronder overeenkomsten met andere betrokken partijen, 
om ervoor te zorgen dat de nodige middelen verschaft worden aan de gebruiker van een werk of een 
prestatie om van de uitzonderingen bepaald in artikel XI.189, § 2, in artikel XI.190, 5°, 6°, 7°, 8°, 12°, 
14°, 15° in 17°, in artikel XI.191, § 1, eerste lid, 1° tot 5°, in in artikel XI.217, 5°, 6°, 11°, 13°, 14° in 16°, 
te kunnen genieten mits de gebruiker op rechtmatige wijze toegang heeft tot het door de technische 
voorziening beschermde werk of prestatie.”) 
172 See e.g.: J. DEENE and K. VAN DER PERRE, “Nieuwe Auteurswet”, N.J.W. 2005, p.886 ff 
173 Compare: S. DUSOLLIER in F. BRISON and H. VANHEES (eds.), Huldeboek Jan Corbet. De 
Belgische auteurswet. Artikelsgewijze commentaar, Brussel, Larcier, 2012, p. 556 
174 See: Art. XI.291, §3 WER 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems allow media content providers to protect 
their media content in the digital age through technical means. Such systems have 
now been granted legal protection themselves. Therefore, users will be liable of 
copyright infringement when they circumvent technological measures or remove rights 
management information. This protection scheme is, however, limited by the fact that 
users keep a right to make use of protected content in situations which are described 
in certain exceptions (e.g. quotation). Such right does not authorise them though to 
circumvent DRM on their own initiative in order to benefit from a particular exception. 
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4. Evaluation 
 
Having described copyright law as a possible instrument to make enjoyment of certain results 
of efforts dependent on the consent of the rightholder, the following section will focus on 
intellectual property justifications and their relevance to media content providers.175 
The reference points for this evaluation are the natural law and economic justifications for IP. 
The goal is to try to find general principles and guidelines within these two schools’ of thought 
that allow us to determine the scope of protection to be granted to media content providers. 
This rather theoretical approach will provide an objective and general frame of reference which 
will be used to complete this delicate balancing act. In essence, it comes down to granting 
rights which appear as an exception to the general principle of free competition. This exception 
has to be justified and its scope has to be delineated in light of other interests, namely the ones 
from users and society as a whole. 
 
4.1. Natural law justifications 
 
In essence, natural law justifications expect IP rights to ordinate behaviour in a way that has 
people comply with their duty to respect the natural rights of others.176 The main argument of 
natural law justifications to grant a person exclusive IP rights is that this provides a suitable 
instrument to command respect for natural rights to the fruits of labour.177  
However, the overarching goal of a coordination of behaviours in accordance with natural 
rights considerations also requires that IP rights refrain from granting a rightholder exclusive 
rights which allow him to prevent perceptible acts of others to the extent that such amounts to 
a failure to respect the natural rights of these others.178 Enough and as good must be left in 
common for others.179 
In essence, the ‘balancing’ approach states that to be as compliant as possible with natural 
rights considerations, IP rights should attribute rightholders an exclusive right to control certain 
acts concerning the embodiments of their intellectual labour and certain perceptible things in 
                                                
175 This section was solely authored by B. Coene and resumes certain finding of his doctoral research 
into the question whether the sui generis intellectual property rights concerning chips, computer 
programs and databases provide a desirable specialisation, when it comes to providing investment 
protection, compared to the traditional intellectual property rights and the traditional law on unfair 
competition. 
176 E.g.: W. FISHER, "Theories of Intellectual Property" in S. MUNZER (ed.), New Essays in the Legal 
and Political Theory of Property, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001,p. 170 ff 
177 See e.g.: L. ZEMER, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, Harv. J.L. and Pub. Pol’y, 29, 2004-
2005, p. 897 ff; J. HUGHES, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Geo. L.J., 77, 1988, p. 288 ff 
178 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P. Laslett, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), Second Treatise, Sec. 27. 
179 E.g.: L. ZEMER supra, p. 918; J. Waldron, From authors to copiers: individual rights and social values 
in intellectual property, Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 1992-1993, 68, p. 887 
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relation to them to the extent that protecting the natural right to the fruits of the labour remains 
justified in view of the limitations this intervention has on the natural rights of others.180 
The guideline put forward by this ‘balancing approach’ is based on the following reasoning. 
The ‘balancing approach’ considers that the main justification according to natural rights 
considerations for the use of IP rights to protect certain investments is the need to complement 
real rights to protect the natural right people have to the fruits of their labour.181 In this respect, 
Locke’s ‘desert for labour’ theory is often called upon to substantiate this proposition.182 In this 
theory, Locke provides a justification of real property rights based on the argument that these 
rights contribute to protecting the natural right that people have to the fruits of their labour.183 
The ‘balancing approach’ concludes that if there is only a system of real rights, there will not 
be sufficient protection of the natural rights to the fruits of labour in respect of intellectual 
creations. In doing so, it builds on several assumptions. A first assumption concerns the 
question of what counts as the ‘fruits’ of one’s labour when it comes to having a natural right 
on these ‘fruits’. In this respect, the ‘balancing approach’ usually assumes that, if a person’s 
labour results is an ‘immaterial good’, the ‘fruits’ of this labour to which this person has a natural 
right are the uses of this ‘immaterial good’ and of its applications in embodiments.184 
The second (often implicit) assumption concerns the question of the extent of protection that 
should result from the law to provide sufficient protection of the natural rights of a person to 
the ‘fruits’ of his labour. In our opinion, the ‘balancing approach’ often appears to take the view 
                                                
180 See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright Lockean”, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 918 (“This principle ensures that a person's natural property right is 
protected only when it is balanced against and regulated by certain social norms, so that it does not 
conflict with the ‘common good’.”); J. WALDRON, From authors to copiers: individual rights and social 
values in intellectual property, Chicago Kent Law Review 1992-1993, p. 887; Compare also: C. GEIGER, 
"Constitutionalising“ Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual 
Property in the European Union", IIC 2006, p. 382ff. 
181 See for example: L. SPOONER, The Law of Intellectual Property; or An Essay on the Right of Authors 
and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in their Ideas, Boston, Bela Marsh, 1855, p. 25-28 
182 See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright Lockean”, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 897ff.; W. GORDON, "Intellectual Property" in P. CAN in M. TUSHNET 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.624; J. 
HUGHES, "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property", The Georgetown Law Journal 1988, p.287-366 
183 J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, London, C. Baldwin, 1824, Chapter V. Of Property, p.144-
159 
184 See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright Lockean”, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 942 (making a distinction, however, between “Simple Ideas and Complex 
Ideas”); Compare also: J. HUGHES, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property”, The Georgetown Law 
Journal 1988, p. 300 (We can justify propertizing ideas under Locke’s approach…”); L. SPOONER, The 
Law of Intellectual Property; or An Essay on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property 
in their Ideas, Boston, Bela Marsh, 1855, p.19 (“If the ideas, which a man has produced, were not 
rightfully his own, but belonged equally to other men, they would have the right imperatively to require 
him to give his ideas to them, without compensation; and it would be just and right for them to punish 
him as a criminal, if he refused.”) 
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that legal intervention should aim to ensure that this person will actually be able to control and 
enjoy these fruits.185 
Building on these assumptions, the ‘balancing approach’ assesses the problem of people not 
having sufficient protection of their natural rights to the fruits of their labour if only a system of 
real rights is in place. This is so as the uses of an ‘immaterial good’ and of its applications in 
embodiments will not be confined to a particular physical embodiment which results from this 
person’s labour.186 This means that real rights will not allow a person to control and enjoy all 
the uses of an ‘immaterial good’ which result from their labour and of its applications in 
embodiments.187 
Following this assessment, the ‘balancing approach’ considers IP rights as a means to solve 
this problem. It evaluates the pros and cons of granting rightholders fully or to a certain degree 
absolute exclusive rights over the uses of ‘immaterial goods’ and its application in 
embodiments. In this respect, this approach takes the view that absolute exclusive rights are 
beneficial to the extent that they are a good way to protect the natural right of rightholders to 
the fruits of their labour.188 However, the more these rights are effectively absolute, the greater 
the possibility that they limit third parties in exercising their natural rights.189 
In view of the pros and cons identified, it is concluded that for IP rights to be as compliant as 
possible with natural rights consideration, it is necessary to calibrate their intervention by 
applying a balancing-test. In essence, this involves weighing the abovementioned pros and 
cons of granting a rightholder to a certain degree absolute exclusive rights over the uses of his 
                                                
185 We belief that this implicit assumption is most clearly reflected in a contrario way in the views 
concerning the following point: to what extent should the natural right of a person to the fruits of his 
intellectual labour, in second instance, be limited to ensure that granting this natural right leaves ‘enough 
and as good’ in common for others. See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright 
Lockean”, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 926ff.; W. GORDON, “A Property Right 
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property”, The Yale Law 
Journal 1993, p. 1560ff. Compare also: W. FISHER, "Theories of Intellectual Property" in S. MUNZER 
(ed.), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p.170ff. and T. PALMER, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy 
of Property Rights and Ideal Objects.”, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1990, p. 830ff. 
186 Compare for example: L. SPOONER, The Law of Intellectual Property; or An Essay on the Right of 
Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in their Ideas, Boston, Bela Marsh, 1855, p.28 and p.31ff. 
187 We take this analysis to be implicitly present in the argumentation of for example ZEMER and 
HUGHES that intellectual property rights can be justified based on the natural right persons have to the 
fruits of his labour. See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright Lockean”, Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 897ff. and J. HUGHES, “The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property”, The Georgetown Law Journal 1988, p. 300 
188 Again we belief that this analysis is implicitly included in the argumentation of for example ZEMER 
and HUGHES that intellectual property rights can be justified based on the natural right persons have 
to the fruits of his labour. See footnote above. 
189 See for example: J. WALDRON, From authors to copiers: individual rights and social values in 
intellectual property, Chicago Kent Law Review 1992-1993, p.887; W. GORDON, “A Property Right in 
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property”, The Yale Law 
Journal 1993, p. 1535 and 1544-1545 
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‘immaterial good’ and its application in embodiments.190 Important factors influencing the result 
of this test will often be the evaluation of the merit of the ‘immaterial good’ and the significance 
of the limitation of the natural rights of third parties.191 
However, in legal theory, we find that guidelines based on natural rights considerations are 
often vague and inconclusive.192 Such is the case in relation to the approach described above 
in relation to the optimal control over embodiments of immaterial goods based on natural rights 
considerations. This approach is unable to provide precise guidelines with regard to the scope 
of exclusive rights given to rightholders. Instead, it simply provides some indications as to 
which rights are to be weighed against each other and a few factors to take into account. 
 
 
4.2. Economic considerations 
 
From an economic perspective, knowledge and ideas constitute public goods. They are non-
rivalrous (its use does not reduce the available amount) and non-excludable (without outside 
intervention, you cannot exclude individuals from consumption). As a result, a completely free 
market would reduce the incentive to invest in such goods and result in a market failure (under-
production). 
Economic considerations base the justification for IP rights in the need to combat market 
failures that prevent a coordination of behaviours concerning embodiments of results of labour 
that maximise welfare. The objective is to reach a point where people are encouraged to use 
resources to provide the greatest gratification of needs.193  Basically, the main economic 
                                                
190 See for example: L. ZEMER, “The Making of a New Copyright Lockean”, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 2005-2006, p. 918 
191 Compare: L. BECKER, "Deserving to Own Intellectual Property", Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1992-1993, p. 
609; J. HUGHES, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property”, The Georgetown Law Journal 1988, p. 305; 
J.. HUYDECOPER, "Originaliteit of inventiviteit? Het technisch effect in het auteursrecht.", BIE 1987, 
p.108 
192 See for example: S. STERK, “Intellectualizing Property: The tenuous Connections Between Land 
and Copyright”, Washington University Law Quarterly 2005, p. 423; W. FISHER, "Theories of Intellectual 
Property" in S. MUNZER (ed.), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 184 ff 
193 E.g.: K. KOELMAN, Copyright Law and Economics in the EU Copyright Directive: Is the Droit 
d´Auteur Passé?, IIC, 2004, p. 605-606; C. GREENHALGH and M. ROGERS, Innovation, Intellectual 
Property, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p. 17 ff 
Natural rights considerations determine the scope of exclusive rights through a 
balancing approach. This means balancing natural rights with real rights, which allow 
rightholders to enjoy and control the fruits of their labour. These fruits are the use of, 
or material embodiments of the immaterial good. A balancing-test allows to weigh the 
pros and cons of the exclusive right based on factors like the merit of the immaterial 
good and the limitations posed to third parties’ natural rights. This approach is too 
vague to provide precise guidelines on the optimal amount of control for rightholders.
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argument for IP rights is that without them market would not produce a maximising coordination 
of welfare behaviours. 
The establishment of exclusive rights will contribute to the internalisation of the ‘positive 
externalities’ that result from the production of ‘works’ and ‘inventions’. 194  Such positive 
externalities refer to those effects of a person’s behaviour which have a direct, positive 
influence on the capacity of resources to satisfy needs, but which do not influence the person’s 
decision of performing this behaviour, as he does not experience these effects when it comes 
to resources satisfying his needs.195 In view of coordinating behaviour in a way that incites 
people to use resources in a welfare maximising way, such positive externalities are a problem. 
The reason is that they imply that a person will not get an incentive to behave in a way in which 
he uses resources to their full potential to satisfy needs.196 
Property rights and exclusive rights can be used to achieve the internalisation of these positive 
externalities that stand in the way of a welfare maximising coordination of behaviour. 
Transferable exclusive rights ensure their rightholder that the only way for other persons to 
enjoy the use of resources created by others – also in terms of the effects of this use on the 
capacity of resources to satisfy needs – is a voluntary exchange with the rightholder, namely, 
by acquiring a right over the resource or its desired use in return for a price.197  
The important point here is that, having such exclusive rights, implies that the demand which 
others have for enjoying the positive effects of a person’s use of his resources, on the capacity 
of resources to satisfy needs, will always be reflected in a market price for enjoying these 
positive effects which will make the person capable of causing these positive effects by using 
his resources, take into account, ‘internalise’, how others value these effects when he decides 
how to use his resources.198 
Economics see in IP a suitable instrument in the sense that that it grants a person exclusive 
rights that allow the control of perceptible acts concerning the embodiments of results of 
labour.199 The idea, in essence, is that such exclusive rights can offer the rightholder a control 
over those perceptible things which have benefitted from the positive effects of producing his 
result of labour on the capacity of resources to satisfy needs. This is a sufficient control to 
ensure rightholders that the only way for other persons to enjoy their works or performances 
consists of a voluntary exchange in which they acquire exclusive rights relating to such a 
                                                
194 E.g.: K. KOELMAN supra, 607-608; C. GREENHALG and M. ROGERS supra, 26; M. LEMLEY, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, Tex L. Rev., 2004-2005, 83, 1032 ff 
195 E.g.: B. SALANIE, The microeconomics of market failures, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2000, 89; 
R. PINDYCK and D. RUBINFIELD, Microeconomics, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 2001, 622 
196 See e.g.: R. PINDYCK and D. RUBINFIELD supra, 622 
197 E.g.: L. RITTENBERG, Principles of Microeconomics, Flat World Knowledge, Nyack, 2008, p. 150 ff; 
R. COOTER and T. ULEN, Law and Economics, Glenview, Scott, FORESMAN and company, 1988, p. 
45; H. DEMSETZ, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review, 57, 1967, p. 346 
ff 
198 E.g.: R. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. and Econ., 3, 1960, p. 1 ff 
199 E.g.: W. GORDON, Intellectual Property, in: P. CAN and M. TUSHNET (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 622-623; H. DEMSETZ supra, p. 359 
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perceptible thing that benefits from these effects.200 However, the overarching goal of welfare 
maximising coordination also requires that IP rights refrain from granting a rightholder 
exclusive rights to prevent acts which would actually result in the greatest gratification of 
needs.201 
Law and economics analysis results in different outcomes when it comes to stating more 
detailed guidelines202 on how IP rights should be calibrated to achieve this goal. Two of the 
most important approaches to this problem are discussed in the following subchapters. 
 
4.2.1 ‘Incentive versus access’ theory 
 
Under the ‘incentive versus access’ approach, IP rights should provide rightholder the 
exclusive right to control certain acts involving the use of a ‘immaterial good’ to the extent that 
the increase in welfare caused by such an intervention (incentive to create) maximally exceeds 
the decline in welfare it causes by restricting the access to the use of such ‘immaterial 
goods’.203 
This approach considers that an intervention of IP rights is necessary to avoid a market failure 
arising from ‘positive externalities’ in the production of certain products.204 This approach also 
                                                
200 See e.g.: C. GREENHALZ and M. ROGERS supra, p. 26 
201 E.g.: W. LANDES and R. POSNER, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, J. Legal Stud., 1989, 
18, p. 326; S. LIEBOWITZ, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, in: J. PALMER and 
R. ZERBE (eds.), Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, JAI 
Press, London, p. 184 
202 With more detailed guidelines we mean guidelines that do more than simply state that the increase 
in welfare caused be the intervention of intellectual property rights must outweigh or maximally exceed 
the decline in welfare caused by this same intervention. With more detailed guidelines we mean 
guidelines that also say how intellectual property right are to be calibrated to achieve this goal. 
203 See for example: K. BLIND, J. EDLER, M. FRIEDEWALD, Software Patents. Economic Impacts and 
Policy Implications, Cheltenham – Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005, p. 8; J. COHEN, 
“Copyright and the Perfect Curve”, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p. 1801ff.; W. LANDES in R. POSNER, 
“An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, Journal of Legal Studies 1989, p. 326 (“Copyright protection-
the right of the copyright's owner to prevent others from making copies- trades off the costs of limiting 
access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking 
the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”); S. 
LIEBOWITZ, “Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination” in J. PALMER and R. O. ZERBE, 
Jr. (eds.), Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, London, JAI 
Press, 1986, p. 184 (“The primary efficiency issue in the economics of intellectual property concerns 
balancing the incentives to encourage the production of artistic and intellectual works with the cost to 
society of creating deadweight loss.”); K. ARROW, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources 
for invention, Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1959, p. 12 
204 For an explicit reference to the notion of externalities, see for example: J. COHEN, "Copyright and 
the Perfect Curve", Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p.1807; without explicit reference to the notion of 
externalities, but in our opinion clearly describing this phenomenon, for example: W. NORDHAUS, 
“Theory of innovation. An Economic Theory of Technological Change”, The American Economic 
Review, 1969, p. 19 (“Any invention is potentially a public good in the sense that it is indivisible, or that 
it can in theory be used universally at zero marginal cost.”) and K. ARROW, Economic welfare and the 
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builds on the analysis that, in respect of labour resulting in an ‘immaterial good’, the use of the 
positive effects which this labour has on the capability of resources to satisfy needs will actually 
coincide with the uses of the ‘immaterial good’ and of its inclusion in embodiments.205 
The actual reasoning starts with the consideration that real rights will not allow an 
‘internalisation’ of all the positive effects which labour resulting in an ‘immaterial good’ has on 
the capability of resources to satisfy needs.206 Given that real rights do not allow such an 
‘internalisation’, the ‘incentive versus access’ approach contemplates granting fully or to a 
certain degree absolute exclusive rights to the uses of the ‘immaterial good’ and of its 
applications in embodiments.207 In this, the ‘immaterial good’ is taken to be a good point of 
reference to trace positive effects of labour and to offer the possibility of avoiding ‘externalities’ 
by applying a standard solution: absolute and transferable exclusive rights. 
However, this approach concludes that fully or to a certain degree absolute exclusive rights 
have not only potentially welfare enhancing effects, but also potentially welfare adverse effects. 
Their potentially welfare enhancing effects concern the fact that they contribute to create an 
incentive for people to produce immaterial goods.208 To the degree that they are absolute, such 
exclusive rights will provide rightholders more opportunities to explore the ‘immaterial good’ 
and its application in embodiments.209 This results in a market price for enjoying an ‘immaterial 
good’ which will incentivise people to create.210 Where this price motivates people to produce 
                                                
allocation of resources for invention, Santa Monica, The RAND Corporation, 1959, p. 9ff. (“With suitable 
legal measure, information may become an appropriable commodity”) 
205 K. ARROW, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, Santa Monica, The 
RAND Corporation, 1959, p. 13 (“Suppose, as the result of elaborate tests, some metal is discovered to 
have desirable properties, say resistance to high heat. Then of course every use of the metal for which 
this property is relevant would use this information and would be made to pay for it.”) 
206 See for example: W. LANDES in R. POSNER, The economic structure of intellectual property law, 
Cambridge (Mass.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 21-22; S. LIEBOWITZ, 
“Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination” in J. PALMER in R. O. ZERBE, Jr. (eds.), 
Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, London, JAI Press, 1986, 
p. 184 
207 See for example: W. NORDHAUS, “Theory of innovation. An Economic Theory of Technological 
Change”, The American Economic Review, 1969, p. 19 (It should be stressed that the monopoly over 
information is essential for a sensible treatment of invention when invention is a public good.) and K. 
ARROW, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, Santa Monica, The RAND 
Corporation, 1959, p. 9 (“In the absence of special legal protection, he cannot however simply sell 
information on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce 
the information at little or no cost. Thus the only effective monopoly would be the use of the information 
by the original possessor.”) 
208 See for example: W. LANDES in R. POSNER, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, Journal of 
Legal Studies 1989, p. 326 
209 See for example: J. COHEN, “Copyright and the Perfect Curve”, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p. 
1801ff.; S. LIEBOWITZ, “Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination” in J. PALMER and R. 
O. ZERBE, Jr. (eds.), Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, 
London, JAI Press, 1986, p. 184 
210 W. LANDES in R. POSNER, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, Journal of Legal Studies 
1989, p. 343-344 
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‘immaterial goods’ and constitutes a welfare maximising use of resources, IP rights will 
contribute to maximising welfare.211 
The potentially welfare adverse effects of fully or to a certain degree absolute exclusive rights 
concern the fact that they might unnecessarily prevent people from using ‘immaterial goods’ 
and their application in embodiments.212 To the degree that they are absolute, such exclusive 
rights might provide rightholders with a monopoly power to ask a price for using his ‘immaterial 
good’ or its application in embodiments which is higher than the production costs.213 This might 
lead to a welfare loss commonly referred to as a ‘deadweight social losses’.214 This  arises 
from the fact that some people will be willing and able to pay a price for using embodiments of 
the ‘immaterial good’ which covers the actual production costs to make this use possible, but 
will not be willing or able to pay the monopoly price for this use demanded by the rightholder.215 
As a result, these people will have to do without the possible gratification of their needs based 
on using these embodiments of the ‘immaterial good’. However, since these people were 
actually able and willing to pay the production costs, the available resources would not be used 
in the way that generates the greatest possible satisfaction of needs.216 In other words, this 
implies that welfare is not being maximised. 
                                                
211 In this we have to take into account that the incentive which is created by intellectual property rights 
may not unduly lure away resources from the production of resources which cannot enjoy the protection 
of intellectual property rights. See in this regard, for example: G. LUNNEY, “Reexamining Copyright's 
Incentives-Access Paradigm”, Vanderbilt Law Review 1996, p. 488; A. PLANT, “The Economic Theory 
Concerning Patents for Inventions”, Economica 1934, p. 30-51; A. PLANT, “The Economic Aspects of 
Copyright in Books”, Economica 1934, p.167-195 
212 See for example: W. LANDES in R. POSNER, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, Journal of 
Legal Studies 1989, p. 326 
213 See for example: J. COHEN, “Copyright and the Perfect Curve”, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p. 
1801; Standard economic analysis commonly points out that, in reference to a producer in a perfect 
market, a producer with monopoly power will ask a price for goods or services, that is too high, namely 
a price above marginal production cost, and will produce and sell too little of the good or the service, for 
welfare to be maximized. See for example: R. HALL and M. LIEBERMAN, Microeconomics: Principles 
and Applications, Mason, Thomson/South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009, p.296ff. and N. MANKIW, 
Principles of economics, Mason, South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008, p. 328ff. 
214 See for example: S. LIEBOWITZ, “Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination” in J. 
PALMER and R. O. ZERBE, Jr. (eds.), Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents 
and Copyrights, London, JAI Press, 1986, p. 184; For an explanation of the general notion deadweight 
(social) loss in economics, see for example: J. TAYLOR in A. WEERAPANA, Principles of 
microeconomics: global financial crisis edition, Mason, South-Western/Cengage Learning, 2009 p. 191 
(“Deadweight loss: The loss in producers and consumers surplus due to an inefficient level of 
production”); For an explanation of the general notion deadweight (social) loss connected to monopoly 
power, see for example: W. McEACHERN, Microeconomics: A Contemporary Introduction, Mason, 
South-Western/Cengage Learning, 2011, p. 216 (Deadweight loss of monopoly: Net loss to society 
when a firm with market power restricts output and increases the price.) 
215 See for example: J. COHEN, “Copyright and the Perfect Curve”, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p. 
1801; S. LIEBOWITZ, “Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination” in J. PALMER and R. 
O. ZERBE, Jr. (eds.), Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Patents and Copyrights, 
London, JAI Press, 1986, 287 p. 
216 See, for example: J. COHEN, “Copyright and the Perfect Curve”, Vanderbilt Law Review 2000, p. 
1801ff.; Compare also: A. BARRON, “Copyright Infringement, ‘Free-Riding’, and the Lifeworld”, LSE 
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Taking into account these effects, the ‘incentive versus access’ theory concludes that it is 
essential to calibrate the intervention of IP rights in a way that makes sure that their welfare 
enhancing effects are maximised and their welfare adverse effects minimised.217 To do so, it 
concludes that adequate duration and proper exceptions and limitations are essential to have 
IP rights that maximise welfare.218 
This ‘incentive versus access’ approach has been criticised numerous times. A first important 
critique is that, usually, there will not be enough empirical data on the welfare enhancing and 
adverse effects of specific rules to judge their desirability by applying the guideline put forward 
by this approach.219 A second important critique is that the ‘incentive versus access’ approach 
with its focus on incentive and access does not sufficiently take into account that the incentive 
created by IP rights may also have other welfare adverse effects, namely that it will lure away 
resources from the production of assets which cannot enjoy the protection of IP rights, but 
which would constitute a welfare maximising use of resources.220 
 
4.2.2. ‘Absolute exclusivity’ theory 
 
Under the ‘absolute exclusivity’ theory, IP rights should provide rightholders the exclusive right 
to control all acts that result in the use of his ‘immaterial good’.221 This guideline corresponds 
to what GOLDSTEIN aptly describes as “(t)he prescription to structure rights so that, as a rule, 
they encompass every corner of copyright use…”.222 
Similarly to the ‘incentive versus access’ theory, the ‘absolute exclusivity’ theory considers that  
IP rights are necessary to avoid market failures resulting from ‘positive externalities’ in relation 
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to the production of certain products.223 It also builds on the analysis that, in the case of labour 
resulting in an ‘immaterial good’, the positive effects which this labour has on the capability of 
resources to satisfy needs will actually coincide with the uses of the ‘immaterial good’ and its 
applications in embodiments.224 
Once again, it is argued that real rights are not sufficient for the ‘internalisation’ of all the 
positive effects which labour resulting in an ‘immaterial good’ has on the capability of resources 
to satisfy needs. 225  Given that, the ‘absolute exclusivity’ theory then also takes into 
consideration granting fully or to a certain degree absolute exclusive rights to the uses of the 
‘immaterial good’ and of its applications in embodiments.226 The ‘immaterial good’ is taken to 
be a good point of reference to trace positive effects of labour and to offer the possibility of 
avoiding ‘externalities’ by resorting to absolute and transferable exclusive rights. 
However, in its evaluation, the ‘absolute exclusivity’ theory comes to a very different finding 
compared to the ‘incentive versus access’ approach. The ‘absolute exclusivity’ theory contends 
that the more absolute are these rights, the more they will contribute to maximise welfare.227 
This view is usually based on the analysis that, if IP rights are strong enough, rightholders will 
have a ‘pure monopoly’,228 giving them opportunity and the incentive to engage in perfect price 
discrimination.229 Price discrimination refers to a seller charging different prices to different 
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customers for the same good or service230. To do so, a seller must be able to prevent different 
customers from exchanging the good or service amongst them.231 The ‘absolute exclusivity’ 
theory considers that IP rights have to be absolute to allow rightholders to do just that 
concerning the uses of the ‘immaterial good’ and its applications in embodiments.232 
Under the ‘absolute exclusivity’ approach, it is argued that rightholders with a pure monopoly 
will engage in perfect price discrimination. It is assumed that the rightholder will vary the price 
for the uses of the ‘immaterial good’ and its application in embodiments according to each 
person’s individual willingness or capacity to pay.233 This will allow rightholders to maximise 
their own profit.234 
This approach contends that this situation holds nothing but advantages. On the one hand, 
rightholders will offer the use of the ‘immaterial good’ and its application in embodiments to 
every person that is willing and able to pay a price which covers the actual production costs to 
make this use possible and they will do so by demanding the specific price which these 
individual persons are willing and able to pay. If this holds true, the abovementioned problem 
of a ‘deadweight loss’ is avoided.235 On the other hand, since rightholders are able to ask 
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consumers exactly what they are willing to pay, rightholders are believed to receive optimal 
incentives to produce ‘immaterial goods’.236 
This reasoning makes the ‘absolute exclusivity’ approach put forward the abovementioned 
guideline that, to maximise welfare, IP rights should provide rightholders the exclusive right to 
control all acts implying the use of their ‘immaterial goods’. This is to a considerable extent 
diametrically opposable to the guideline offered by the ‘incentive versus access’ approach. 
Whereas the ‘incentive versus access’ approach takes exceptions and limitations to be 
essential so that IP rights enhance welfare, the ‘absolute exclusivity’ approach analyses such 
exceptions as lost incentives and interferences with the possibility to engage in perfect price 
discrimination which actually prevent the maximisation of welfare.237 
The ‘absolute exclusivity’ approach is subject to strong criticism. First, it is questioned whether 
a rightholder, given such absolute IP rights, would actually be able and willing to engage in 
perfect price discrimination.238 Opponents also doubt that, in reality, absolute IP rights have all 
the welfare enhancing effects claimed by the ‘absolute exclusivity’ approach.239 Finally, there 
is the more fundamental point that legal intervention is inherently incapable of tracing and 
internalising all positive externalities and should not even aim to do so.240 
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Economic theory aims to coordinate behaviours to maximize welfare by using scarce 
resources in a way that the greatest satisfaction of needs is achieved. The existence 
of positive externalities can result in a market failure. For instance, this would occur if 
the activity of media content providers resulted only in benefits to third parties and not 
to its creators, which in turn would result in a reduced incentive to develop media 
contents. 
Transferable exclusive rights are a way to combat this problem. They can be used to 
internalize positive externalities, as they will allow rightholders to establish a price for 
the use of their products or services. However, the scope of these rights must be 
balanced in order to prevent excesses that might in turn lead to a decline in welfare. 
Two theories try to provide a solution to this balancing exercise: the ‘incentive versus 
access approach’ and the ‘absolute exclusivity approach’. 
The ‘incentive versus access’ approach contends that the amount of welfare 
maximization through exclusive rights should always be greater than the decline in 
welfare through restricting access. Therefore, exceptions and limitations to the 
exclusive rights are essential.  
The ‘absolute exclusivity approach; contends that all acts concerning the use of an 
immaterial good should be subject to absolute exclusive rights. This should lead to 
perfect price discrimination. This approach reduces the relevance favours e.g. pay per 
use practices. 
None of these theories is perfect and both are subject to criticism as they require a 
vague balancing approach and fail to provide concrete guidelines. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
It is clear from what is set out above that Intellectual Property (IP) rights may provide a broad 
scope of protection. Within the existing IP framework,  copyright and related rights assume 
particular relevance to media content providers, as a result of the subject matter that we are 
dealing with and the rights that the result from the law. These exclusive economic rights allow 
media content providers to make certain acts of users in relation to media content dependent 
on the rightholders’ consent. 
The relevant acts in relation to the media value chains consist of reproducing, communicating 
to the public, distributing and, under certain circumstances, simply using or accessing the 
media content. However, these rights are not absolute. Significant limitations and exceptions 
apply and these cannot be neutralised even by deploying Digital Rights Management systems. 
Yet, the extent of control that can legally be exerted by media content providers is significant 
and can be exercised throughout the media value chains, ranging from production to 
distribution and even playback.241 
However, there remains legal uncertainty regarding certain notions and principles, such as the 
notion of communication to the public, the doctrine of exhaustion and the summa divisio 
tangible-intangible. Their clarification by the legislative and judiciary would allow media content 
providers and users to more freely interact with each other. 
Furthermore, in relation to the scope of exclusive rights and applicable limitations and 
exceptions, a delicate balance has to be struck between, on the one hand,  the protection of 
the result of efforts of the author or performer and, on the other hand, the positions of users 
and of society as whole. Commentators have tried to contribute to this balancing exercise. 
Arguably, natural rights and economic justifications for IP rights do not provide specific and 
clear guidelines. Better guidelines on the optimal amount of control that should be granted to 
media content providers should be devised if sound policies are to be established.  
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